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Abstract
The Use of Heuristics in Identifying Self-Propagating Malicious Mobile
Code

Jesse Twardus
Self-propagating malicious mobile code, or worms, has become a major threat to
modern computer systems. As these types of viruses thrive in a networked computing
environment, they have exploded in popularity in recent years.
Modern defenses have proved inadequate in protecting computer systems from
the worm threat. The most often used remedy is a signature-based detection system that
scans each incoming network packet for the presence of a signature identifying a specific
worm. As a new worm or variant of an existing worm is released, this signature set must
be updated to include definitions for the new worm or variant.
In this thesis we propose a heuristic-based system for worm detection. This
system should be able to detect many different worms and worm variants using only a
small heuristic set. The use of heuristics also should eliminate the need to update the rule
set as new worms or worm variants are released.
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“I guess you all know about tapeworms... ? Good. Well, what I turned loose in the net
yesterday was the.., father and mother of all tapeworms ....
My newest-my masterpiece-breeds by itself....
By now I don't know exactly what there is in the worm. More bits are being added
automatically as it works its way to places I never dared guess existed ....
And-no, it can't be killed. It's indefinitely self-perpetuating so long as the net exists. Even
if one segment of it is inactivated, a counterpart of the missing portion will remain in
store at some other station and the worm will automatically subdivide and send a
duplicate head to collect the spare groups and restore them to their proper place.”
John Brunner. Shockwave Rider.

1 Introduction
John Brunner’s 1975 book, Shockwave Rider, is believed to be the origin
of the use of the term “worm” for computer code that moves from one computer on a
network to another (although the author called them “tapeworms” as in the quote above.)
In this early science-fiction novel, society is dominated by computer networks. The hero
must create a worm program to traverse the networks and uncover a secret government
plot. The author envisions “worms and counterworms” interacting and competing with
each other.
The first step towards realization of such a program, accomplished by researchers
at the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center [1], was a program designed to simply search a
network for idle computers. It was recognized from the beginning that a major issue in
creating a worm was the ability to control the spread of the worm once it was unleashed.
An uncontrolled worm could have disastrous consequences.
The potential for misuse of worm programs was recognized in 1988 when a
student at Cornell University unleashed the Morris worm (sometimes known as the
Internet worm.) The Morris worm spread by exploiting several vulnerabilities in
software running on BSD-based versions of the UNIX operating system. The vulnerable
software included versions of the popular sendmail and finger programs. The Morris
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worm, while relatively benign, demonstrated the ease with which a worm can spread
throughout the Internet community [2].
The Morris worm proved to only be the beginning of malicious worm
programs. Worms such as CodeRed and the more recent Nimda and Slammer have
successfully infected hundreds of thousands of computers, far more than the Morris
worm was able to infect. Modern worms such as these are able to spread very quickly;
some are able to infect most vulnerable hosts in a matter of hours. As a result of their
speed and the size of the vulnerable population, worms are often able to temporarily
bring down networks and infrastructure around the world. Additionally, worms often
carry payloads such as backdoors to allow an attacker remote access to an infected
machine.

1.1 Worm Overview
A worm is defined as “a self-replicating program able to propagate itself across
networks, typically having a detrimental effect.”1 A worm begins as a single program
running on an initial machine. The worm will then use the available network connections
to propagate a copy of itself to other machines on the network. Thus, the number of
worms in existence will multiply as the worm spreads throughout the network.2
Worms are not inherently malicious entities. As previously stated, the first worms
were designed to perform simple network maintenance tasks. As long as the worm can
be controlled, there is no reason to avoid this type of program. However, the issue of
worm control is not a trivial one. In the past, worms have been written that attempt to
remove malicious worms and patch the system to prevent re-infection. While this may
appear to be a noble idea, these “counterworms” often wreak just as much havoc on the
network as do the malicious worms they are trying to prevent. Creating a worm that
gains unauthorized access to a system is generally illegal, no matter what the intentions.
For example, the Welchia (or Nachi) worm attempted to remove the Blaster worm and
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From Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Revised Third Edition
A program that does not copy itself while propagating through the network, but rather “jumps” from
system to system, is known as a “creeper” or sometimes as a “rabbit.”
2
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patch the system to prevent re-infection. Welchia created so much excess network traffic
that it too was considered a malicious worm, and it was removed by antivirus software.
The difference between a worm and a virus is often blurred. A virus is defined as
“code that replicates a possibly evolved copy of itself.”1 Clearly, a worm is a
subcategory of a virus. A virus is more general than a worm in several key ways. First
of all, a virus may exist on its own or attached to another file, while a worm is an entity
unto itself. Second, a virus may exist only within a single system, traveling to other
systems only when files are exchanged, as on a floppy disk. A worm, on the other hand,
always makes use of network connections in order to propagate itself. Third, an
important aspect of a virus is the method it uses to hide itself. A worm is unconcerned
with hiding itself – it is clearly visible in the network traffic. Finally, a virus may require
an action on the part of the user in order to become active (for example, running an
executable file.) The power of a worm comes from its ability to spread itself with no
action needed from the user. Once a worm begins to execute, the only requirement
needed in order to spread to a new system is that the new system is open to the worm’s
propagation mechanism.
Worms are often confused with email viruses. An email virus, especially prolific
in today’s internet, spreads itself as an attachment to an email. The user must then open
the attachment in order for the virus to infect the user’s system. The email virus will then
search the user’s system for email addresses and mail copies of itself to these addresses.
Examples of these types of viruses are MyDoom, Bagle (or Beagle), and Netsky. The
important difference here is that while these viruses are able to spread themselves across
networks, they still rely on a user action in order to become active. Once again, a true
worm requires no action on the part of the user in order to become active and propagate.
It is popular opinion in the computer security community that defending a system from a
worm is more difficult that defending a system from an email virus.
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1.2 Anatomy of a Worm
Worms are generally composed of several components. The worm must be able
to transmit themselves to new hosts, infect new hosts, and begin the cycle anew.
Optionally, a worm may carry a payload – some additional functionality contained in the
worm. These components are discussed here.
The worm must be able to propagate itself to new hosts. Often times, the worm
will simply randomly decide on a new host to target, as in generating a random IP
address. For malicious worms, this is the simplest method of discovering potential new
victims. Alternatively, some worms preferentially scan the local network for vulnerable
hosts. The idea here is that if one vulnerable host is found on a network, there will likely
be other vulnerable hosts also on that network. Also, the worm can spread rapidly on the
local network after initially bypassing the firewall. This technique will also help to
achieve a quicker infection rate because, if two IP addresses are close to each other, those
two systems are likely close in the network topology.
The worm must also be able to infect new hosts. In the case of malicious worms,
this is done through an exploitable flaw in a network service or services already running
on the target system. This exploitable flaw is almost always a buffer overflow in a
network service, resulting in the ability of the worm to execute arbitrary code at a high
privilege level. (See Section 3.1.4 for more information.) Additionally, some worms,
such as Nimda, are multipartite, meaning that the employ multiple infection vectors. In
order to secure a system from a multipartite worm, all infection vectors must be
accounted for.
Finally, some worms carry a payload. This payload may be a backdoor program
that will allow a malicious user remote access to the compromised system. The payload
may be a virus that the worm is assisting in infecting new systems. The payload might
also be a denial-of-service (DoS) attack that all systems infected by the worm will
execute at a preset date and time. Some worms carry no payload at all and exist simply
to spread to other systems.
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1.3 Summary

The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner. The next
section will outline the problem addresses by this paper and state the goals of the
research. Section 3 will present some background information and related work relevant
to the research. Section 4 will discuss the system proposed by this paper. Section 5
contains the results of the system, and Section 6 presents conclusions and future work.
Following the paper are appendices containing sample worm network traffic, the
implementation of the heuristics, and selected definitions.
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2 Problem
This section will present the underlying rationale and problem addressed by this
paper. It will also enumerate the goals and limitations of the study.

2.1 Rationale
Several options are currently available to detect, block, remove, or otherwise
defend computer systems from the worm threat. These include antivirus software,
firewalls, and network intrusion detections systems (NIDS). Each of these systems is
briefly described here, followed by the problems presented to each by the worm threat.
For a more detailed discussion of the operation of each of these systems, please see
Section 3.1.
Antivirus software is the most common computer defense mechanism. Antivirus
software scans files on a disk and in memory looking for viruses. The systems generally
use a string-matching algorithm in order to detect known viruses by a signature. Some
even employ advanced techniques such as code emulation and heuristics in order to
detect unknown viruses and variants of known viruses.
Firewalls may be implemented in hardware or software. In either case, a firewall
will regulate network traffic based on certain user-defined criteria. Firewalls may also
perform other tasks such as encryption of network traffic or network address translation.
An NIDS is similar to a firewall in that it also filters network traffic. However,
the NIDS can provide a finer-grained traffic filter than a firewall can. An NIDS is often
used in conjunction with a firewall – the NIDS to detect anomalous traffic, and the
firewall to block that traffic from reaching the protected network.
Worms pose a problem for computer defense systems. Is a worm something that
should be identified by a traditional antivirus scanner? Or is a worm something that
should fall under the jurisdiction of network security devices such as an NIDS or
firewall? A good solution would be to use some combination of these three systems.
However, worms still pose an interesting problem to each of these systems.
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If an antivirus system is to be used to detect a worm, the worm must have
already propagated to the system. In this case, the damage has most likely already been
done. The best that can be hoped for is to prevent further spreading. A system located
behind a firewall that is blocking all inbound traffic is completely secure from the worm
threat. Blocking all inbound traffic, however, is unsuitable for most systems. The
firewall will often need to allow certain types of traffic to pass, and worms located in this
traffic will be able to reach the system. The use of an NIDS allows the network to be
more open than a firewall does. Whereas a firewall may simply block all packets on a
given port or for a given protocol, the NIDS can inspect this traffic for certain
characteristics and take the appropriate action. An NIDS will only filter traffic based on
user-defined rules. For worm detection, these rules are often simple signatures specific to
one worm. A worm can subvert a signature-based NIDS by altering itself enough that the
signature no longer applies to it. Thus, none of these systems provides a complete
solution to the worm threat.

2.2 Statement of the Problem
An NIDS is the best choice to implement a worm detection system, as a firewall
does not provide fine-enough-grained detection capabilities and an antivirus system is
unsuitable for network-based threats that require no user intervention. However, NIDS
used today rely on signatures specific to one individual worm or worm family. As the
number of existing worms grows, so does the set of worm signatures. It is possible that
the number of existing worms will become so large that it is no longer feasible to check
network traffic for the presence of these signatures due to performance reasons.
More importantly, this signature set must be updated (either manually or
automatically) as each new worm or worm variant is discovered. If a worm is modified,
even slightly, a new signature must often be generated. The discovery of the new threat,
along with the development of a suitable new signature, takes time. By the time the
signature set is updated, the new worm may have already spread to the network.
Finally, worms rely on some sort of exploit in a network service in order to infect
new targets. Often, these vulnerabilities are discovered by a security research company
7

or software vender and made public, along with a patch. Other times, the vulnerability is
discovered by the worm author and never made public. If this is the case, there is no
chance for an end-user to patch the vulnerable software before the worm begins to
spread. Also, there will be no NIDS signature either for the worm or the vulnerability.
Systems exhibiting these types of these so called “zero-day” vulnerabilities will be left
open to the worm attack.

2.3 Hypothesis
Worms should exhibit some common characteristics. All follow an infectionpropagation-payload cycle. A host becomes infected by a worm and then begins the
process of propagating the worm to other vulnerable hosts. The infection process
consists of the use of an exploitation technique in order to compromise a vulnerable host.
The propagation process involves a method for determining the next host to target,
followed by the transmittal of the worm to that host. The optional payload process may
implement some additional functionality such as a DoS attack.
This paper will investigate the possibility of detecting worms using a set of
heuristics designed to detect worms based on characteristics exhibited by a large number
of worms. This heuristic set will be implemented in an NIDS. The heuristic set should
be able to identify an arbitrary worm based on characteristics found in all (or most)
worms.
There are several advantages in using a heuristic-based worm detection system.
Firstly and most importantly, the heuristics rule set should be able to detect both known
and unknown, or new, worms without having to update the rule set for each new worm
family or worm variant. The system should also be robust to polymorphic worms, or
worms that are able to modify themselves on the fly. Secondly, the rule set will be small
in comparison to a signature-based rule set where each worm and worm variant has its
own signature. Finally, a second benefit from the small-sized rule set is that the NIDS in
which the worm detection heuristics is implemented should be able to perform much
faster than a large, unwieldy signature-based rule set.
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2.4 Limitations
There are a few limitations imposed on this study. Firstly, the study is not
concerned with performance issues associated with the use of an NIDS. NIDS rules that
scan all network traffic for certain characteristics may incur network performance loss if
the volume of network traffic is great. Further research should be done to fine tune the
heuristic rule set so that minimal performance penalties are incurred.
Secondly, the study is restricted in the number of worms that were used. Worms
were selected on the following criteria: they were available and they were able to run on
the available systems. The worms used here are several variants of Blaster, several
variants of Sasser, Slammer, and CodeRed version 2.

2.5 Summary
In summary, there are several options available for worm detection, prevention, or
removal today. Unfortunately, none of these are sufficient for the ever-increasing worm
threat. This paper discusses a worm-detection system that uses a set of heuristic rules in
order to identify both known and unknown worms and worm variants. The next section
will present relevant background information and previous research related to this study.
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3 Related Work
The preceding section lists the reasons for this study, as well as the goals of the
study. This section will discuss some necessary background information, other related
research, and will close with a detailed examination of a few worms.

3.1 Background Information
In the previous section, it was stated that the computer defense options available
today are insufficient to secure systems from the worm threat. An explanation of each of
these systems (antivirus software, firewalls, and NIDS) is provided here to see why this is
the case. Following that is a discussion of exploitation techniques that may be used by a
worm. The exploitation technique is central to the infection phase of the worm, so these
techniques are described in detail here. These techniques will be used later in the
generation of possible heuristics.

3.1.1 Computer Defense Systems – Antivirus Software

Modern antivirus software makes use of a variety of techniques in order to detect
both known and previously unknown viruses and worms. These techniques range in
complexity from simple string matching methods to advanced code emulation and
heuristics. These methods are briefly described here. A more complete discussion can be
found in [3]. It should be noted that, in general, the techniques may be applied to both
files on the hard disk and to processes running in memory.
String Matching: The simplest scanning method employed by antivirus software
is that of string matching. A sequence of bytes that identifies a program as malicious is
stored in a database. The antivirus software then scans the files on the system for the
presence of such a string. If a match is found, the file is infected and a proper action,
such as quarantine or removal, is taken. This method is the oldest and most popular
method used by antivirus systems.
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Exact or Nearly Exact Identification: If antivirus software is able to exactly
identify a file infector virus, the antivirus software may be able to safely remove the virus
and restore the file. Exact identification can be achieved by calculating a checksum over
all constant bits in the virus body. This method can be combined with a string matching
method to exactly identify a virus detected by the string matching algorithm.
Nearly exact identification follows the same process as the string matching
method; only here several strings are used instead of just one. By using several
somewhat generic strings, the general form of the virus can sometimes be identified and
safely removed. This is useful in the case of unknown viruses.
Algorithmic Scanning: Algorithmic scanning refers to the practice of
developing an algorithm to identify a specific virus. By following a set of steps written
in a special virus scanning language, a specific virus or worm can be identified. This
method is only used when none of the simpler methods is capable of identifying the virus
in question.
Code Emulation: Code emulation is one of the most powerful techniques
employed by an antivirus scanner. When using code emulation, a virtual machine is set
up to emulate the current environment. The potentially malicious code is then run in this
virtual environment so that no harm can be done to the actual system. Code emulators
will use a set of rule definitions or heuristics in order to identify possible viruses.
Heuristics: Some advanced antivirus software uses heuristics in order to identify
new or unclassified viruses and worms. These systems consist of a set of general rules
that flag virus-like behavior. When a process exhibits one or more of these behaviors, a
weighted score is assigned to the process for each matched heuristic. All the scores are
then fed into a summing function, and, if the sum is greater than some threshold, the
process is declared a virus.
Integrity Checking: A final possible method used by antivirus software for virus
scanning is that of integrity checking. An integrity checker calculates a checksum of
each executable file of the system and stores these values in a database. If the integrity
checker notices that the checksum of a particular file no longer matches the value stored
in the database, a possible infection has occurred.
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Antivirus software has evolved such that it is capable of discovering and
removing complex viruses and worms. It has the advantage of being able to decrypt
certain viruses and worms, whereas other defense systems can be subverted by using
encryption. However, antivirus software has the major disadvantage when dealing with
worms in that the worm must have already reached the system in order for the antivirus
system to detect it. In this case, the damage has most likely already been done. This is
such a disadvantage that antivirus software alone it unsuitable to defend against the worm
threat.

3.1.2

Computer Defense Systems – Firewalls

A firewall is a system, implemented in hardware or software, which restricts
access to a network. Firewalls usually operate at the network or transport layer and filter
traffic by examining the packets as they arrive at the firewall. A firewall will either block
a packet or let it pass onto the network depending on a set of user-defined rules. This set
of rules constitutes the access restrictions to and from the network [4].
A firewall provides excellent defense against the worm threat. Unlike antivirus
software, a firewall can prevent a worm from ever reaching a target computer.
Unfortunately, this defense comes at a cost. A network located behind a firewall that
blocks all incoming traffic is completely isolated from the outside world. This is an
unacceptable situation for many networks. Thus, rules need to be implemented in the
firewall to define what traffic may pass through to the network. The rules defining the
access restrictions for a firewall are very general when compared with the rules defining
access restrictions for an NIDS (See Section 3.1.3.) For example, a rule in a firewall
might accomplish something such as “block all traffic to TCP port 80.” This particular
setup will effectively block all worms that communicate on TCP port 80. However, if
there is a web server behind this firewall, TCP port 80 will probably need to be open.
Thus, the network (or at least the web server) is open to worms communicating on TCP
port 80. A firewall is generally unable to be much more specific in implementing rules
than defining hosts, protocols, and ports. This limits the firewall to something of an “allor-nothing” situation.
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3.1.3 Computer Defense Systems – Network Intrusion Detection Systems

A network intrusion detection system (NIDS) is a system that intercepts network
traffic as it arrives and inspects these packets, much like a firewall. Suspicious packets
are identified by the NIDS, and one of two actions is taken. Some NIDS will simply
write an entry into a log file while more sophisticated systems will actually block the
packet in question. An NIDS will identify suspicious packets by looking for certain
strings of bytes in the packet [5]. This can be as simple as signature-matching or can be
as sophisticated as a heuristic-based detection engine. Fundamental to NIDS systems is
the idea that malicious traffic can be differentiated from “normal” traffic. Some
characteristics must exist that make it possible to classify traffic as malicious.
An important feature for an NIDS to have is the ability to reassemble fragmented
packets. If an NIDS is unable to reassemble packets, an attacker may subvert the NIDS
by spanning portions of an attacker over several packets. Also related to this is the flowtimeout problem. An NIDS must be able to decide whether to group a sequence of
packets as being part of the same communication session or whether to split the group
into multiple sequences.
Like the firewall, the NIDS has the advantage of being able to prevent worms
from ever reaching a host on the network. Also, the NIDS provides an advantage over a
firewall in that the NIDS permits the network to operate in a more open mode, while still
providing some level of security. Whereas the firewall may simply block all packets for
a given port or protocol, the NIDS can inspect this traffic for certain characteristics and
take the appropriate action. This makes the NIDS the ideal place to implement a
heuristics-based worm detection system.
3.1.4 Exploitation Techniques – Buffer Overflow
Upon arriving at a target host, a malicious worm must make use of some
exploitation technique in order to infect that host. If an exploitation technique is to be
employed by a worm, a requirement is that the vulnerability is exploitable remotely. As
the presence of an exploitation technique is a characteristic common to all worms, this
13

paper will investigate these techniques in detail in order to use them as possible
heuristics. The most common of these techniques, and hence the most common
technique used by worms, is the buffer overflow which is described here.
Popularized by the Morris worm of 1988, buffer overflow attacks have become
one of the most prevalent exploitation techniques used today. A buffer overflow can be
used to alter a program’s data, alter a program’s execution path, execute arbitrary code,
or simply crash the program. The generic term “buffer overflow” encompasses a variety
of techniques, the most common of which will be described here.1
A buffer is a homogenous data type – a data type that is composed of one or more
like data types. This is synonymous with the array data type from the C programming
language. The buffer type most commonly seen in buffer overflow attacks is the
character buffer (commonly called a string.) A buffer overflow occurs when a program
attempts to place data in a buffer too small to hold that data. In certain situations, after
the buffer is full, the computer will continue to overwrite the remaining data into the
adjacent memory locations, overwriting whatever may have been there before. This idea
of data filling up a buffer and then overflowing onto other memory, as in a glass filled
with water until the water spills over onto the floor, results in the term “buffer overflow.”
Fundamental to the concept of a buffer overflow exploit is the “channeling
problem.” A channeling problem exists “if two information channels are merged into
one, and special escape characters or sequences are used to distinguish which channel is
currently active” [6]. Examples of this are storing return addresses and frame pointers
next to function parameters and local variables on the stack or the storing of memory
management information next to allocated user memory on the heap. The merging of
channels is not necessarily a bad idea. It is when an attacker2 can manipulate a control
channel by using a data channel that this becomes a security problem.
Data-based Buffer Overflows: There are many types of buffer overflows that
can be exploited remotely. Of these, the simplest is the basic data-based buffer overflow.
Here, data from the target buffer will be used to overwrite data stored in another local
1

This discussion of buffer overflows will use the C programming language, Linux operating system, and
IA32 architecture for the examples. The concepts are certainly not restricted to this environment, however.
2
In this paper, “attacker” is used generally, and could mean an actual human being or a malicious program,
such as a worm.
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variable. The effect of overwriting other variables with arbitrary data is fully dependant
on the program under attack. As an example, consider the following code in Figure 1.
int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
char accessOK;
char userPass[25];
if (argc != 2)
{
printf("Usage: overflow [password]\n");
exit(0);
}
accessOK='F';
strcpy(userPass, argv[1]);
if(strcmp(userPass, "p4S5w0rd")==0)
accessOK='T';
if(accessOK=='T')
printf("Access Granted!\n");
else
printf("Access Denied!\n");
return 0;
}

Figure 1 – An example of code vulnerable to a buffer overflow exploit.

This simple program reads a parameter from the command line, compares the parameter
against a password, and prints a message.
This program is vulnerable to a buffer overflow. The string userPass is declared
to be of size 25, but the command line parameter is copied, unchecked, into the userPass
string. Thus, by entering a large amount of data on the command line, the data will fill
the userPass buffer and, due to the way the variables are pushed onto the stack, overwrite
the data in the accessOK variable.
If, after filling the userPass buffer with junk data, the attacker overwrites the
accessOK variable with the value ‘T’, the program will print the message “Access
Granted”, when it should have printed the message “Access Denied.” (See Figures 2 and
3.) Clearly, this simple example can be extended to non-trivial situations, although
situations where an attacker can use the type of exploit to their advantage are rare.
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Stack-based Buffer Overflow: Also known as “smashing the stack”, the classic
stack-based buffer overflow is the most common form of buffer overflow. This is

Figure 2 – The stack region of memory when running the code from Figure 1.
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Figure 3 – The stack region of memory for the code from Figure 1 after an attacker executes a buffer
overflow attack.

void function(int a, int b, int c)
{
char buffer1[5];
char buffer2[10];
int *ret;
ret = buffer1 + 28;
(*ret) += 10;
}
void main()
{
int x;
x = 0;
function(1,2,3);
x = 1;
printf("%d\n", x);
}

Figure 4 – Code demonstrating the classic stack-based buffer overflow.
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precisely the type of overflow used by the Blaster and Sasser worms. The difference
between this type of overflow and the previously-described data-based buffer overflow is
that a stack-based buffer overflow uses a buffer overflow to exploit certain characteristics
of the stack and alter the flow of program execution.
A stack-based buffer overflow is possible on most of today’s popular operating
systems, including Linux, Windows, and several versions of BSD and UNIX. Several
properties of the stack lead to the existence of this type of exploit. Firstly, when a
function in a running process calls another function, the operating system first pushes the
function’s parameters on the stack in reverse order, followed by the saved return address
and saved frame pointer (in order to restore the calling function), and finally the new
function’s local variables. See Figure 5. Another property of the stack that leads to the
possibility of a buffer overflow is that, with the exception of a few niche operating
systems, the stack region of memory is executable. Finally, as a general rule, an
operating system will load programs into approximately the same area of memory each
time, if possible. This is advantageous for worm authors, who try to make their exploit as
generic as possible so that it applies to many different systems and hence increase the
prolificacy of the worm.
Central to the stack-based buffer overflow is that, by overflowing a buffer in a
particular function’s local variable region of memory, it is possible to overwrite the value
of the return address for this particular function [7]. See Figure 6. By overwriting the
return address of the function, it is now possible to make the system execute any arbitrary
instruction.
To demonstrate the details of a classic stack-based buffer overflow, a modified
example from [7] is presented. The code in Figure 4 will print the value ‘0’ for x, rather
than ‘1’ as it initially appears. This is because in function() the pointer ret is set to
initially point to the beginning of buffer1. It is then increment so that it now points to the
saved return address. See Figures 7 and 8.
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Figure 5 – A typical stack.
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Figure 6 – Demonstration of the ability to overwrite SFP and RET on the stack.

20

Figure 7 – The stack before the RET pointer is incremented.
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Figure 8 – The stack after the RET pointer is incremented. RET now points to a different
instruction.
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Next, the memory referenced by ret is incremented by ten. This is done to skip
over the instruction “x=1;” In order to determine the exact value to use, a debugger such
as gdb is used. From the code in Figure 9, it can be seen that when function() returns,
EIP will point to instruction 0x8048373. In order to skip the next instruction, the value
ten is added to EIP so that it now points to 0x804837d. The exact value to add will be
system specific, although the value will be similar on similar systems.

(gdb) disass main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
0x804834e <main>: push %ebp
0x804834f <main+1>: mov %esp,%ebp
0x8048351 <main+3>: sub $0x8,%esp
0x8048354 <main+6>: and $0xfffffff0,%esp
0x8048357 <main+9>: mov $0x0,%eax
0x804835c <main+14>: sub %eax,%esp
0x804835e <main+16>: movl $0x0,0xfffffffc(%ebp)
0x8048365 <main+23>: sub $0x4,%esp
0x8048368 <main+26>: push $0x3
0x804836a <main+28>: push $0x2
0x804836c <main+30>: push $0x1
0x804836e <main+32>: call 0x8048330 <function>
0x8048373 <main+37>: add $0x10,%esp
0x8048376 <main+40>: movl $0x1,0xfffffffc(%ebp)
0x804837d <main+47>: sub $0x8,%esp
0x8048380 <main+50>: pushl 0xfffffffc(%ebp)
0x8048383 <main+53>: push $0x804849c
0x8048388 <main+58>: call 0x8048268 <printf>
0x804838d <main+63>: add $0x10,%esp
0x8048390 <main+66>: leave
0x8048391 <main+67>: ret

Figure 9 – Disassembly of main() function using gdb.

How will this technique be used in an actual attack? An attacker must first
discover an exploitable buffer – one in which it is possible to modify the return address.
Typically, the next step is to insert shellcode into the buffer, followed by the necessary
overflow characters to reach the return address. The return address is then modified, as
seen in the previous example, to point back into the exploited buffer. Thus, upon
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returning, the next instructions executed will be those of the shellcode in the buffer.
However, there are several considerations that must be accounted for. Firstly, an attacker
will typically not know the exact location of the shellcode in memory. Thus, the attacker
will typically pad the beginning of the shellcode with NOPs or other similar do-nothing
instructions. This greatly increases the chances of the exploit working because the
modified return address can now point to anywhere in a range of addresses – if the return
address points to any of the NOPs, eventually the instruction pointer will enter the
shellcode. This is sometimes referred to as using a “NOP ramp” or “NOP sled.”
Secondly, an attacker will typically follow the shellcode with the estimated return address
repeated several times. This greatly increases the chances of properly overwriting the
saved return address. Thus, a typical stack-based buffer overflow attack will take the
form shown in Figure 10. Finally, as most buffer overflows occur in character buffers, or
strings, the shellcode must not contain NULL characters, line feeds, or any of several
other special characters that terminate strings [7].

Figure 10 – The format of a typical buffer overflow attack.

Off-by-one buffer overflow: An off-by-one buffer overflow happens when a
program attempts to validate the size of the data before placing it in a buffer, but the
programmer mistakenly identified the size of the buffer [8]. Consider the code in Figure
11. In this case, the programmer has mistakenly used “<=” instead of “<”. Thus, it is
possible to overflow this buffer, but only by a single byte.
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With only a single byte to overflow, it is impossible to modify the saved return
address on the stack. However, when the exploitable buffer is the first local variable
pushed on the stack, as in the example above, it is possible to overwrite the lowest order
byte of the saved frame pointer. (The IA32 architecture is a little endian architecture.)

func(char *sm)
{
char buffer[256];
int i;
for(i=0;i<=256;i++)
buffer[i]=sm[i];
}

Figure 11 – Code vulnerable to an off-by-one buffer overflow.

When a function returns, one of the steps performed is to copy the address pointed
to by EBP into ESP. This value is popped from the stack and stored in EBP to return to
the previous stack frame. ESP now points to the saved return address, this value is
popped into EIP, ESP is moved to point to the top of the previous stack frame, and
execution proceeds as normal.
To perform an off-by-one exploit, shellcode is, as usual, inserted into the target
buffer. The address of the shellcode and four junk bytes are also inserted into the buffer,
just after the saved frame pointer. The buffer overflow modifies the saved frame pointer
so that it now points to the four junk bytes. When this function returns, the stack cleanup routines begin. First, a “movl EBP, ESP” is executed so that both EBP and ESP now
point to the modified saved frame pointer on the stack. Next, a “popl EBP” removes this
value from the stack and places it in EBP so that EBP now points to four junk bytes
located after the shellcode but before the spoofed return address in the target buffer.
Finally, the value now pointed to by ESP (the saved return address) is popped into EIP
and ESP now points to the top of the previous stack frame (in the case of the example,
main()’s stack frame.) When main returns, the clean-up routines begin again. Once
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again, EBP is copied into ESP. This time, however, EBP point to the junk bytes in the
exploited buffer. ESP and EBP now both point here. This value is popped into EBP, and
ESP now points to the spoofed return address (which points to the shellcode.) This value
is assumed to be the saved return address and is popped into EIP. EIP now points to the
start of the shellcode, thus transferring control to the attacker [8]. See Figures 12 - 18 for
an illustration.
This exploit requires a unique set of circumstances in order to succeed. The exact
size of the stack must be known in order to manipulate EBP. Also, the exploitable buffer
must be located directly before the saved frame pointer on the stack. However, this
example does demonstrate the possibility of redirecting the flow of execution when one is
unable to directly manipulate the saved return address.
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Figure 12 – The stack at the beginning of an off-by-one buffer overflow attack.
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Figure 13 – The stack after overwriting the low-order byte of SFP.

28

Figure 14 – The stack after the execution of the “movl EBP, ESP” instruction during the stack cleanup routine.
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Figure 15 – The stack after executing the “popl EBP” instruction during the stack clean-up routine.
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Figure 16 – The stack after the “movl ESP, EBP” instruction in the clean-up routine following
main().
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Figure 17 – The stack after the “popl EBP” instruction in the clean-up routine following main().
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Figure 18 – The stack as execution begins in the attacker’s shellcode.
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Heap-based Buffer Overflow: The heap is the region of a process’s memory
reserved for variables that are allocated at run-time. For example, variables created using
malloc() or new in the C and C++ languages, respectively, are located on the heap.
Unlike the stack, the heap grows upwards, from low memory addresses to high memory
addresses. The size of the heap can be extended by using the brk system call.
If a buffer is created on the heap and filled with data of an unchecked size, it may
be possible to execute arbitrary code through the use of a buffer overflow (sometimes
called “smashing the heap”) [9]. However, this exploit technique is more complicated
than a stack-based buffer overflow due to the fact that there are no return addresses or
frame pointers located on the heap. Arbitrary code may be executed or process data may
be changed through an overflow because of the way the memory on the heap is managed.
The discussion here will focus on the GNU C Library’s memory allocator, commonly
known as “Doug Lea’s Malloc.” This allocator includes the popular C functions
malloc(), realloc(), free(), and calloc(). The general technique described here can be
applied to other memory allocation algorithms as well, provided those algorithms store
control information “in-band.”
The GNU C memory allocator (hereafter referred to simply as “malloc”) stores
control information before and after the chunks of memory (hereafter referred to as
“chunks”) both in use (“allocated”) and not currently in use (“free”). Chunks are stored
in circular linked lists. For an allocated chunk, the control information includes the size
of the previous chunk if that chunk is free, the size of the current chunk, and flags
indicating whether the previous chunk is currently in use and whether the current chunk
was allocated using the system call mmap. This information is then followed by the
user’s data. For a free chunk, the control information includes the size of the current
chunk, flags as previously described, a pointer to the next free chunk (not the next
physical chunk), and a pointer to the previous free chunk (not the previous physical
chunk). Another property of the malloc algorithm that is important here is that a free
chunk can never be adjacent to another free chunk. These two chunks are always
coalesced into a single free chunk. Also, free chunks are stored in bins by size. Each bin
contains a circular, doubly linked list of the free chunks in that bin. While a detailed
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knowledge of the malloc algorithm is required to fully understand a heap-based overflow,
this is beyond the scope of this paper. [9] and [10] provide a complete discussion for the
interested reader.
The basic premise behind a malloc-based heap overflow is as follows. In order to
remove a free chunk from its circular, doubly linked list, malloc uses the unlink macro,
show in Figure 19. Malloc uses the frontlink macro to insert a freed chunk back into the
circular, doubly linked list, shown in Figure 20. By examining these macros, it is evident
that, if an attacker can overflow a given chunk of allocated memory and overwrite the
control information in an adjacent chunk, the attacker may be able to write to an arbitrary
memory address.

#define unlink( P, BK, FD ) {
BK = P->bk;
FD = P->fd;
FD->bk = BK;
BK->fd = FD;
}

Figure 19 – The code for the unlink() macro from malloc.
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#define frontlink( A, P, S, IDX, BK, FD ) {
if ( S < MAX_SMALLBIN_SIZE ) {
IDX = smallbin_index( S );
mark_binblock( A, IDX );
BK = bin_at( A, IDX );
FD = BK->fd;
P->bk = BK;
P->fd = FD;
FD->bk = BK->fd = P;
} else {
IDX = bin_index( S );
BK = bin_at( A, IDX );
FD = BK->fd;
if ( FD == BK ) {
mark_binblock(A, IDX);
} else {
while ( FD != BK && S < chunksize(FD) ) {
FD = FD->fd;
}
BK = FD->bk;
}
P->bk = BK;
P->fd = FD;
FD->bk = BK->fd = P;
}
}

Figure 20 – The code for the frontlink() macro from malloc.

As an example, consider the case where an attacker can overflow onto the control
information of an adjacent free chunk. In a free chunk, the pointer to the next free chunk
is “fd” and the pointer to the previous free chunk is “bk” in the listings shown. An
attacker could overwrite the fd pointer with the address of a function pointer and the bk
pointer with the address of shellcode. When unlink() is called to remove the chunk from
it’s list, the address now pointed to by fd will be overwritten by the address of the
shellcode (bk). This overwritten function pointer could be a function pointer in the
Global Offset Table (GOT) or one of malloc’s debugging hooks that are called before
each operation. Now, when that function is called, the shellcode will be executed [9, 10].
This technique is used by the Slapper worm which overwrites the free() function pointer
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in the GOT by exploiting a heap overflow in the OpenSSL module in the Apache
webserver.
Some special considerations must be accounted for when exploiting the unlink()
technique. The “BK->fd=FD;” line of code in unlink() will overwrite the middle of the
shellcode. A jump instruction must be inserted in the shellcode to jump over this section.
Also, the addresses used by the attacker must be slightly manipulated to account for
offsets within the chunk control structure [10]. It is also worth noting that the overwritten
chunk does not necessarily have to be free. An attacker can manipulate the control flags
within the chunk to make malloc think that this chunk is indeed free so that unlink() can
be run on this chunk.
Alternatively, an attacker might use the frontlink() macro to accomplish the same
execution of arbitrary code. frontlink() is run on allocated chunks of memory that are
being freed. The general idea of overwriting pointers and using the macro to write the
shellcode address to another location is the same here as it is in the unlink() technique. In
either technique, the prerequisites are that an exploitable buffer exists on the heap and
that a sequence of allocations and frees properly set up the heap for an attack [9, 10]. The
combination of these prerequisites and the fact that a call to the overwritten function
pointer must also exist within the process’s code make a heap buffer overflow rarer and
more complicated that a stack-based overflow. This technique does demonstrate,
however, that an overflow need not always occur on the stack.
Return-into-libc: A return-into-libc exploit is a variation of the stack-based
buffer overflow that does not overwrite the saved return address with the address of
shellcode. Instead, this technique involves overwriting the saved return address on the
stack with the address of a libc function, such as system() or execl(). This exploit is
advantageous in that it does not require an executable stack or executable heap. On some
systems, it is possible to make the regions of memory containing the stack and the heap
non-executable, thus rendering stack- or heap-based buffer overflows useless. A returninto-libc exploit is a viable alternative in this case.
This technique is a fairly simple variation on the stack-based buffer overflow. To
illustrate this, consider the code in Figure 21. It is evident that this code is susceptible to
a conventional buffer overflow. To perform a return-into-libc exploit, an attacker would
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overflow the buffer buf, overwrite the saved return address with the address of a libc
function (system() for example), follow this with a return address, and finally pointers to
the arguments required by the libc function. The return address is required because all
libc functions require an address to return to after completion. The pointers to the
arguments are necessary to successfully run the libc function. A normal call to system
might look like “system(“/bin/sh”);” In this case, a pointer to the string “/bin/sh” must
follow the return address in the return-into-libc overflow. This string could exist in any
number of places – the attacker may place it in the overflowed buffer, it might be in an
environment variable, or may already exist in the process’s memory [11, 12].

int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
char buf[10];
strcpy(buf, argv[1]);
return 0;
}

Figure 21 – Example of code vulnerable to a return-into-libc exploit.

When the function containing the overflowed buffer returns, it will call the libc
function with the given arguments. See Figures 22 and 23 for an illustration. This is
sufficient to provide the attacker with a shell. It should be noted that this exploit does not
require any shellcode and will work in non-executable stack/heap environments [11, 12].
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Figure 22 – A stack before a return-into-libc attack.
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Figure 23 – A stack after a return-into-libc attack.

3.1.5 Exploitation Techniques – Format String Vulnerabilities

Format string exploits are closely related to buffer overflow exploits. Like the
buffer overflow exploit, a format string exploit also results from a channeling problem
and can be exploited remotely. In this case, the control channel is formatting information
used by several functions dealing with strings in the C programming language and the
data channel is, as usual, a buffer filled with data supplied by the user.
Format string vulnerabilities occur due to poor programming practices when using
such C string functions as printf(), fprintf(), sprintf(), vprintf(), and the like.
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Additionally, functions such as syslog() and setproctitle() may be vulnerable [6]. To see
how misuse of this family of functions may result in the execution of arbitrary code,
consider the code statement “printf(str);” The proper format of this function is
“printf(“%s”, str);” However, in the case of the first example, the user is inadvertently
given the opportunity to provide the format string to the printf() function. The printf()
function is expecting a format string, even if the programmer did not supply one. If a
user is able to set the value of the variable str, that user could store a valid format string at
the beginning of str. The printf() (or similar) function will interpret this as the format
string. A malicious user can use this to simply crash the program (as in a DoS attack) or
display memory locations for use in future attacks [6].
Alternatively, an attacker could use the format string to overwrite a saved
instruction pointer, in much the same way as a stack-based buffer overflow. In a format
string exploit, an attacker uses a series of stack pops to move the stack pointer to point to
the saved return address. For example, if the format string is filled with “%08x”
sequences, the printf() function will read those values off the stack, popping them off the
stack as it goes along. The key here is that the attacker must correctly guess the number
of bytes in between the printf() function and the saved return address. Once the stack
pointer is pointing to the saved return address, the attacker is able to overwrite that
address by using the somewhat obscure “%n” format function. This function writes the
number of characters written to a supplied location. For example “printf(“foobar&n\n”,
(int *)&i);” will set i equal to six. However, the %n function will crash if it attempts to
write very large integer values, such as memory addresses. This can be circumvented
during an attack by overwriting one byte of the return address at a time. For example,
“printf(“%16u%n%16u%n%32u%n%64%n”, 1, (int *) &w, 1, (int *) &x, 1, (int *) &y,
1, (int *) &z);” will set w = 0x10, x = 0x20, y = 0x30, and z = 0x40 [6]. Note that the
“%u” in the example writes an unsigned decimal interger padded to the specified
precision.
By putting all the pieces together, arbitrary code may be executed. The attacker’s
format string will contain a series of stack pop’s to move the stack pointer to point to the
saved return address followed by the four-part overwrite of the saved return address.
This newly supplied return address will point to the traditional NOP ramp leading to
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shellcode. Variations on the format string may be used to overwrite such data as GOT
function pointers and heap management information.

3.1.6 Exploitation Techniques – Input Validation

Another possible exploit technique that may be used by a worm is an input
validation exploit. An input validation exploit results from the failure of a network
application to parse certain characters out of user input.
A popular example here is “SQL injection.” SQL injection is an attack technique
that can be used against an SQL-based database with a network interface. For example,
consider the case of a webpage that allows a user to enter some data, say a customer
name, through a simple HTML form. This data is then passed as a variable into a SQL
statement through the use of a language such as PHP. The SQL statement is then
executed against the database and a result is displayed for the user. If the user, in the
HTML form, enters a string such as “John Doe;drop table customberDB; --“ the drop
table command will be executed by the database if the application does not recognize
special characters such as ‘;’.1 Special characters such as these should be parsed out of
user input in order to maintain the integrity of the application.
This technique may be applied to other applications as well. The possibility of an
input validation attack depends on the application, the existence of special characters that
allow a user to execute other commands than the intended ones, and the failure of the
application to remove these special characters from the input stream.

3.1.7 Exploitation Techniques – URL Encoding

A final exploitation technique that is possible to execute remotely, and is thus
useful to a worm, is that of URL encoding. In the past, it was possible to execute an
arbitrary program residing on a web server by executing the directory-traversal exploit.
This arbitrary program is usually a command shell, such as cmd.exe on a Windows
1

The “—“ characters at the end of the statement are used to comment out anything that exists in the SQL
statement after where the injected code is inserted. This is done to avoid causing an error when executing
the new statement.
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system. Worms may use this ability to enable services such as a TFTP server in order to
propagate across the network.
To accomplish a directory traversal exploit, an attacker could manipulate the URL
request sent to the web server using the “..” sequence to indicate the directory “up one
level” from the current directory. Thus, an HTTP request of the form:
GET /dir_name/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe

when fed to a vulnerable web server would run the program “cmd.exe” if the attacker has
traversed the proper number of directories. This so-called dot-dot-slash exploit has since
been removed from most, if not all, modern web servers and other web applications.
These applications filter the dot-dot-slash out of web requests.
In some web applications, it is still possible to perform this type of directory
traversal by using URL encoding. There are many ways to encode information to
facilitate data exchange between various systems. One of the most popular is Unicode.
Using a Unicode representation of the '/' character, it may be possible to pass a directory
traversal unnoticed through the application's filters. By rewriting the previous example,
but using this Unicode technique, the HTTP request becomes:
GET /dir_name/..%c0%af../winnt/system32/cmd.exe

%c0%af is the Unicode representation of '/'. Other possible representations of this
character are %c1%1c, %c1%9c, and %c1%9v. This technique will be successful on
some modern systems [14].
Another alternative representation of the "../" sequence is to use a hexadecimal
notation. In hexadecimal notation, '/' can be written as "%5c". Thus, another alternative
way of rewriting the first example is:
GET /dir_name/..%5c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe

However, a string resembling the above will generally not pass the web application's
filters. In order to bypass the filters using this scenario, an attacker may use the so-called
"double-decode" exploit. By noting that the character '%' can be represented in
hexadecimal notation as "%25" and using the HTTP request:
GET /dir_name/..%255c../winnt/system32/cmd.exe
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an attacker can run the program "cmd.exe." This is because, as a web server or similar
application is checking the URL for a possible directory traversal, the "%255c" string is
not fully decoded. This decoding is put off until some later time before the URL is
processed. This technique is also successful against some modern systems [14].

3.2 Related Research
A wealth of worm-related research has already been performed. This section
briefly describes those approaches, and makes a few comments on each.
[16] states that there are three general methods for stopping or slowing down a
worm. The first is prevention, which means to reduce the number of available vulnerable
exploits through methods such as proper software engineering practices. The second is
treatment, which involves disinfection and software patching. Finally, the third is
containment by techniques such as content filtering. It is possible that the containment
strategy could be made completely automated.
[16] goes on to experiment with containing worm infections through content
filtering. Although the authors stop short of actually implementing a content filter, or
even describing how to determine what content to filter, they do determine
mathematically that a content filter is effective in preventing worm infection. The
authors conclude that a content filter is most effective when placed at an ISP-level router.
One reason for this placement strategy is that, by placing the filter at the ISP-level, this
will minimize the number of filters that must be deployed.
Aside from some sort of network security device, such as a firewall, the most
effective, and perhaps simplest, method of worm prevention is that of applying software
patches in a timely manner. [17] experiments with automating this process through use
of a counterworm. The idea is that the counterworm would propagate through the
network and patch the vulnerable exploit in all vulnerable hosts. Alternatively, the
counterworm could disinfect, or remove the worm, from infected systems. Although an
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interesting idea, as previously stated, counterworms, in practice, do more harm than
good.1 [17] also investigates signature-based content filtering.
The authors of [18] experiment with worm containment by limiting the
connection rate of an infected machine. This system uses a rate control mechanism,
implemented on backbone routers, to limit the connection rate of machines that are
attempting to make a large number of connections.
[19] investigates methods for worm detection. The authors propose base their
research on that fact that, when a worm is scanning for potential targets, a large number
of ICMP Destination Unreachable (ICMP Type 3) messages might be generated by
routers. This is the case because many worms generate target IP addresses randomly.
When an infected machine attempts to connect to an IP address that is not associated with
any available host, an ICMP Type 3 message may be generated.2 The paper details a
system where ICMP Type 3 messages are also forwarded to a centralized collection
system, in addition to being sent to the original destination. When the collection system
notices that a single source has caused many ICMP Type 3 messages to be generated, that
source is likely to be infected with a worm. This system does not provide any wormblocking capabilities. Rather, it is intended to quickly discover active worms.
One problem with the above system is that not all routers generate ICMP
messages. The RFC on ICMP states that routers should be able to generate these
messages, not that they should generate them. This was addressed in the paper. It was
found that for random target selection using ICMP Ping requests, an ICMP message was
returned 12.85% of the time and no response at all was received 85.21% of the time. The
remaining times an active host was discovered. Thus, it is evident that many routers do
not generate the necessary messages. The authors did state, however, that they felt that
enough routers exist that generate the proper messages in order to implement the system.
Implementing ICMP messages on more routers would improve the performance of the
system. A second consideration is the centralized collection system. Routers would need
to be configured to send the ICMP messages to this system. This constitutes an
1

The Welchia worm, which attempted to remove Blaster, is evidence of this. Welchia caused so many
network problems that the detrimental effects of this worm outweighed the good.
2
Whether is not a router generates ICMP messages is a configurable option. Many routers are configured
to not generate these types of messages.

45

implementation problem in that router administrators must be willing to participate in this
system in order for it to be successful. This is a problem with all of the papers discussed
here that propose some sort of global system. Systems such as these will always have
policy issues to deal with.
A similar method is used in [20] in order to slow down the spread of worms. This
particular paper proposes a system which detects worm activity using the aforementioned
ICMP Destination Unreachable messages. In addition, this system adds the detection of
TCP RESET messages. A TCP RESET message will be generated by a system when a
TCP SYN message is received on a closed port on that system. The presence of a large
number of TCP RESET messages on a network can also indicate the presence of
scanning activity by a worm. If a worm is configured to target a particular port and that
port is closed on all or most systems on the network, a large number of TCP RESET
messages being sent to the same destination will be generated. Normal network traffic
should not exhibit this characteristic.
This system uses these two methods of worm detection in order to limit the rate at
which an infected system may transmit messages. Thus, it is hoped that the worm can be
sufficiently slowed so that the Internet community may react to the new worm.
One problem with systems such as these is that the system is not able to protect
the first few scanned computers. The system must identify several ICMP Destination
Unreachable or TCP RESET messages in order to identify the worm. If a vulnerable
system is one of the first to be scanned, it will likely become infected.
An alternative method for worm detection is proposed by the authors of [21].
This method maintains a record of destination addresses and ports as seen in the local
network traffic. If a host receives a packet on a port, and later begins sending packets to
other hosts on that same port, this host is possibly infected. If it is also noticed that the
host’s outgoing traffic rate has risen greatly from its normal level, this host is considered
infected. While an interesting idea, this method seems to require a lot of record keeping
and may not scale well. Another problem is that this method, by design, allows some
number of systems to become infected before it can detect the presence of a worm.
[22] combines several techniques into a single worm detection system. Firstly,
the system watches for data that is repeated frequently on the network. This
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characteristic may be indicative of a worm transmitting its code from host to host.
Secondly, a count of the number of unique source and destination addresses seen in the
traffic is maintained. If this number increases greatly, it may indicate the presence of a
worm. Finally, the system watches for a large number of failed connection attempts, as
in [19] and [20].
Instead of focusing on network traffic characteristics of worms, [23] instead
focuses on the fact that worms must utilize some exploit technique in order to propagate.
This exploit technique, as previously described, is usually some sort of buffer overflow.
This system recognizes that it is possible to detect a buffer overflow in network traffic by
scanning for the presence of a known return address. Because the return address can vary
slightly, the proposed system scans for addresses falling within a certain range. See
Section 3.1.4 for more information. This system relies on known exploits and return
addresses, which are system specific. Hence, this system must be updated as new
exploits are discovered. Nonetheless, it is a useful idea because it is able to prevent all
types of worms using a given exploit on well-known systems.
A final method for worm detection is proposed in [24]. In this paper, the authors
describe the concept of a “network telescope” – “a portion of routed IP address space in
which little or no legitimate traffic exists.” A worm may be detected by a network
telescope because, as the worm randomly generates target IP addresses, some of these
addresses will invariably fall within the address range of the telescope. For example,
given a network telescope occupying a class A-sized network and a worm generating
completely random IP addresses to target (such as CodeRed), the authors state that the
telescope will observe at least one packet from the worm within 4.9 minutes with a
99.999% probability. By examining the traffic received by the telescope, the paper
experiments with predicting the start and end times of the internet-wide attack, as well as
predicting the number of targeted hosts. It is up to the telescope to differentiate between
malicious traffic and traffic sent to the telescope erroneously, perhaps by a packet
corruption or misconfiguration. As presented in the paper, a network telescope is mainly
used for gathering information about worm infections. The paper does go on to state that,
using the proposed system, it would be impractical to collect data in enough locations to
construct an overall view of a system such as the Internet.
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[15] expresses the need for a centralized agency that should be responsible for
identifying and analyzing worm outbreaks, preventing and fighting worm infections, and
predicting future worm attacks. This so-called Cyber Center for Disease Control (CDC)
would be an international organization that handles all worm-related events. Several
similar organizations exist today, such as CERT/CC at Carnegie Mellon University.
[15] also attempts to predict the future of worm technology and proposes several
techniques a worm could use to make itself more effective. One of the techniques is “hitlist scanning.” In hit-list scanning, the worm’s author makes a list of systems that are
likely to be vulnerable to the worm. When the worm begins to propagate, it starts with
the systems on the hit-list, then moves on to a more traditional random scanning method.
This technique will greatly speed up worm propagation because the slowest phase of a
worm’s life is the initial phase where there are few worms randomly scanning for
potential victims. Traditional worms rely on luck to hit a vulnerable host, whereas a hitlist increases the chances of the worm spreading. In order to further speed up hit-list
scanning, each new infected host can be given its own partition of the hit-list to scan.
This avoids the situation where every newly infected machine rescans the hit-list. This
type of worm is termed a Warhol worm in the paper. A further variation on hit-list
scanning is used by the theoretical Flash worm, also described in [15]. For this worm,
the worm author makes an Internet-sized hit-list by pre-scanning large ranges of IP
addresses in order to generate a large list of potential victims. This, combined with the
techniques used by the Warhol worm, makes for an extremely fast-spreading worm.
Another technique proposed by [15] is that of a slow worm. A worm such as this
moves so slowly that it generates almost no noticeable anomalous network traffic. After
a large number of hosts have been infected, presumably unnoticed, the worm could
launch a large scale attack, such as a DoS attack. The paper also predicts the possibility
of worms that are able to communicate with each other or that are able to update
themselves, much as nonmalicious software updates itself by downloading an update
from the internet. A worm that can update itself would be able to exploit new
vulnerabilities as they are discovered.
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Clearly, much useful worm-related research has already been done. However,
many of the worm detection systems previously described are fairly specific in the
characteristics used for detection. Of the worm detection methods described above,
nearly all focus on one specific aspect of a worm, such as many failed connection
attempts or the presence of a certain exploit. The system described in this paper is more
general. The heuristic-based system, to be described in the next section, aims to find
enough characteristics common to a large number of worms so that it will be able to
detect a large number of worms, both known and unknown. This will be accomplished
through the use of several heuristics that are identified in several popular worms from the
past few years.
Additionally, as is evident from the previous discussion, most systems are either
for worm prevention or worm detection, not both. Systems designed to prevent worms,
such as rate limiting, make no mention of how to detect the worms in the first place.
Also, many systems designed to detect worms are only designed to report the presence of
the worm, not to also defend against it. It would be desirable to design a system that
incorporates both prevention and detection. The system described in this paper is able to
achieve both goals.

3.3 Descriptions of Selected Worms
This section will show the details of several actual worms from the past few
years. This is done so that it can be clearly demonstrated that worms often display
common characteristics, hence it is possible to derive heuristics to detect large numbers
of worms. The worms discussed here are Blaster, Sasser, Slammer, and CodeRed.

3.3.1 Blaster

The Blaster worm was first seen on August 11, 2003, less than one month after its
related exploit was disclosed. Blaster, also known as Lovsan, MSBLAST, or Poza,
makes use of the RPC DCOM vulnerability discussed below. Although this vulnerability
is present in several versions of the Windows operating system, Blaster specifically
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targets only two – Windows XP and Windows 2000. Nevertheless, the worm
successfully infected over 400,000 systems.
The Exploit: The RPC DCOM exploit was discovered by the Last Stage of
Delerium Research Group and was posted to the Bugtraq mailing list on July 16, 2003
[25]. The post stated that a buffer overflow vulnerability had been discovered in the
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) interface which implements the Distributed Component
Object Model (DCOM) services. This vulnerability was present in Windows versions
NT 4.0, 2000, XP, and 2003 Server. The post went on to state the Microsoft had been
notified and that the proof-of-concept exploit code would not be made available.
Microsoft promptly address the issue in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS03-026
[26] initially published on July 16, 2003 and later revised on September 10, 2003. The
bulletin also provided a patch.
RPC, originally specified by the Open Software Foundation in RFC 1050, is a
variation of the local procedure call (LPC) methodology. In LPC, a caller process places
parameters to a second process in a specified location. Control than passes to the second
process which, upon returning, places the parameters back into the specified location for
use by the caller process. RPC is simply the networked version of this, allowing for
inter-process communication between processes running on two different computers [27].
The version of RPC implemented in the affected Windows systems is actually RPC
version 2, specified in RFC 1831, with some additional functionality added by Microsoft.
The Windows Component Object Model (COM) allows for local inter-process
communication. DCOM, the networked version of COM, uses the RPC mechanism to
allow local processes to communicate with remote ones [28]. It is this RPC - DCOM
interface where the buffer overflow vulnerability occurs, allowing arbitrary code to be
executed with system privileges.
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HRESULT CoGetInstanceFromFile(
COSERVERINFO * pServerInfo,
CLSID * pclsid,
IUnknown * punkOuter,
DWORD dwClsCtx,
DWORD grfMode,
OLECHAR * szName,
ULONG cmq,
MULTI_QI * rgmqResults
);

Figure 24 – The API call exploited by Blaster.

The actual vulnerability lies in the file rpcss.dll in a function GetMachineName()
which is responsible for extracting the server name for use in initialization of the related
DCOM object. The client requests initialization of the DCOM object through the API
call in Figure 24. According to MSDN, the parameter szName is the "File to initialize
the object with using IPersist::File. May not be NULL." If provided with a long string, as
in:
hr = CoGetInstanceFromFile(pServerInfo, NULL, 0, CLSCTX_REMOTE_SERVER,
STGM_READWRITE, L"C:\\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc",1,&qi);

this parameter can result in a buffer overflow. However, the API checks the size of this
parameter, so the API cannot be used directly as an exploit. The size of this parameter is
not checked, however, when sent as a request from client to server in an RPC transaction.
The parameter in question will be translated by the server into the form:
L"\\servername\c$\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc"

In the function GetMachineName(), Windows attempts to place this unchecked string
into a buffer of size 0x20, the maximum size of a NETBIOS name. Thus, the saved
return address for the calling function of GetMachineName() is overwritten and now
points to a NOP ramp in the attacker's shell code. This shell code has been previously
placed in a local buffer in the stack frame of the fourth-level caller of the
GetMachineName() function [29, 30].
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Other worms that exploit this vulnerability are Welchia and Reidana.
Infection: Blaster begins by creating the registry key
“HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
"windows auto update" = MSBLAST.EXE”. This ensures that the worm will start up
again after the infected computer is rebooted. A requirement of the worm is that the
executable file, named MSBLAST.EXE, is located in the %System%\ directory
(C:\Windows\System32\ on Windows XP). The worm also creates a mutex "BILLY" to
avoid reinfecting a previously compromised machine. Blaster sleeps for twenty second
intervals, and then wakes to check for an active network connection [32].
Propagation: Once an active connection is found, Blaster opens twenty TCP
threads which scan IP addresses starting at a base address and increasing in a linear
fashion. This base address is calculated using one of two possible methods [31, 32]. The
first method is to begin with the IP address of the local machine - A.B.C.D. The first two
octets, A and B, are left unchanged. The third octet, C, is left unchanged if its value is
less than twenty. Otherwise, a random value less than twenty is subtracted from C's
value, and this new value is used for C. The fourth octet, D, is always set to zero. The
second method of computing the base address is to generate a completely random address
between 0.0.0.0 and 255.255.255.0 and use this address as the base address. In either
case, scanning begins at this base address and continues, incrementing the fourth octet by
one each time, until the value of the fourth octet is 254.
Each scan attempts to connect to the target computer by sending a TCP SYN
message to port 135. Once an open port is found, the worm begins the attack. The worm
makes no attempt to discover the operating system of the target machine - 80% of the
time the worm sends the data for the XP attack, 20% of the time the Windows 2000 data
is sent [32].
A successful attack binds a remote shell (cmd.exe) to port 4444 of the target
machine. The worm binds its own crude TFTP server to UDP port 69 on the attacking
computer and, using the remote shell, instructs the target machine to download of copy of
the executable, msblast.exe, from the attacking computer by using the Windows TFTP
client. This executable is placed in the %System%\ directory of the target machine, and
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the executable is started by the attacking computer through the remote shell. Thus, the
process begins anew [31, 32].
Payload: Blaster is programmed to perform a DDoS attack on
windowsupdate.com on the 16th and 31st days of the months January through August and
on any day during the months of September through December. This DDoS attack is a
specially-created SYN packet, approximately forty bytes long, sent to the target every
twenty milliseconds. Effectively, this is a SYN flood attack on TCP port 80 of the target.
If the target cannot be resolved, the address 255.255.255.255 is used as the target for the
DDoS attack. The DDoS packets contain no data except for the TCP/IP header.
Interestingly, the DDoS attack was fairly unsuccessful. windowsupdate.com was simply
as alias for the real URL of Microsoft's Windows Update feature microsoft.windowsupdate.com. Microsoft simply removed the alias from DNS [31].
Variants: There are several known variants of the Blaster worm. All variants
make use of the same exploit and follow the same operation pattern. The only
differences between the variants are the registry keys that are created, the registry values
set, the executable names, the mutexes created, the target of the DDoS attack, and the
contents of a text string located in the worm body.
The following table describes the differences between the variants of the Blaster
worm. Any detail not listed in the table can be assumed to be the same as previously
described. Also, most variants contain a text string located in the worm body. Although
these text strings are usually unique to a variant, they have been omitted from the table
because many of the messages are vulgar.
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Table 1 – Blaster Variants
A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

8/11/03

8/13/03

8/13/03

8/18/03

8/29/03

9/1/03

9/19/03

2/4/04

4/21/04

UPX

none

FSG

Aspack

Modified
UPX

Aspack

Modified
UPX

UPX

UPX

File name

msblast.ex
e

penis32.ex
e

teekids.ex
e

mspatch.e
xe

mslaugh.e
xe

enbiei.exe

enilora.ex
e

mschost.e
xe

Registry
key1

windows
auto
update =
msblast.ex
e

windows
auto
update =
penis32.ex
e

Microsoft
Inet xp.. =
teekids.ex
e

Nonton
Antivirus
=
mspatch.e
xe

Windows
Automatio
n=
mslaugh.e
xe

www.hidr
o.4t.com =
enbiei.exe

windows
auto
update =
enilora.ex
e

Windows
shellext.32
=
mschost.e
xe

Date
discovere
d
Runtime
compressi
on

Mutex
DDoS
target

Other

billy
windowsu
pdate.com

billy
windowsu
pdate.com

original
version

contains
the
Lithium
backdoor
program

billy
windowsu
pdate.com

billy
windowsu
pdate.com

1

silly

muuie

kimble.org

tuiasi.ro

All registry keys are located at
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
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billy
windowsu
pdate.com

billy
windowsu
pdate.com

svchosthlp
.exe
eschlp.exe
MSUpdate
=
svchosthlt
p.exe
SPUpdate
=
svchosthlp
.exe
Helper =
eschlp.exe
billy
windowsu
pdate.com
downloads
a copy of
itself from
a website
and sets IE
homepage
to
www.getg
ood.biz

3.3.2 Sasser

Sasser is a worm that uses the LSASS vulnerability described below. First seen
on May 1, 2004 and based on exploit code written by houseofdabus, Sasser managed to
infect over 100,000 vulnerable hosts. Although the LSASS vulnerability is present on
several versions of Microsoft Windows, Sasser is only able to infect Windows XP and
2000 Professional. Sasser may be able to run on other vulnerable versions such as
Windows 95, 98, ME, and 2003, but the LSASS process will crash causing Windows to
restart before the worm can fully execute. The worm is packed using the PE Compact v2
runtime packer [32].
Sasser was written by a German teenager who is, as of the date of this paper,
awaiting a court date related to damages caused by the Sasser worm. The worm was
written in the Visual C programming language.
The Exploit: The eEye Digital Security discovered a remote buffer overflow
vulnerability in the Windows Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) on
October 8, 2003. The vulnerability was reported to Microsoft, who subsequently released
an advisory and patch in the security bulletin MS04-011 on April 13, 2004. The
vulnerability affected Windows versions NT, 2000, XP, and 2003 [33].
LSASS itself is responsible for user authentication using the Winlogon service.
Additionally, LSASS generates security tokens for authenticated users. When used
remotely, LSASS operates using RPC (as discussed in the previous section). This
specific vulnerability is present in the LSASS/RPC endpoints on TCP ports 139 and 445.
The vulnerable functions are located in LSASRV.DLL and are used to write entries to a
log file, "DCPROMO.LOG." A remote user, with no special privileges, is able to specify
values to be written to this log file. These values are then created using a vsprintf()
function with no bounds checking. By sending overly long values to be written to the log
file, a remote user is able to create a classic stack-based buffer overflow and execute
arbitrary code at the system privilege level [33].
The functions responsible for the creation of and writing to this log file are
DsRolepInitializeLog() and DsRolepLogPrintRoutine(), respectively. Parameters to the
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log file that can be overflowed in the vsprintf() function are DnsDomainName, SiteName,
SystemVolumeRootPath, DsDatabasePath, DsLogPath, ParentDnsDomainName,
ParentServer, and Account. The parameter names are self-explanatory. Most Active
Directory services, however, call RpcImpersonateClient() which changes the security
context of the client, making the client unable to write to the log file. This will cause the
vsprintf() function to not be executed. There is a function,
DsRolerUpgradeDownlevelServer(), in this API that does not call
RpcImpersonateClient() but rather calls DsRolepInitializeLog() directly.
DsRolerUpgradeDownlevelServer() does not provide the ability to specify a remote
server to use for an RPC call; it always uses NULL for the host name, indicating the local
host. The API does not check that this call actually came from the local host though, so if
an attacker creates this packet by hand and specifies a remote host, the attacker will be
able to access the DsRolepInitializeLog() and DsRolepLogPrintRoutine() functions and
the aforementioned buffer overflow vulnerability [33].
Infection: Sasser creates the registry key
“HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
avserve.exe = %Windows%\avserve.exe” to ensure that it will resume execution after the
infected machine is rebooted. Sasser also creates a mutex named "Jokaba31" to avoid
reinfecting a previously compromised machine. Sasser uses the API
AbortSystemShutdown in an attempt to block system shutdowns or restarts [32].
Sasser copies itself as a file named AVSERVE.EXE to the %Windows% folder
(usually C:\Windows). The worm also creates a log file "WIN.LOG" in the root
directory. This log file contains the number of hosts that this host was able to infect and
the IP address of the most recently infected host [32].
Propagation: Sasser creates 128 threads to generate semi-random IP addresses.
A new address is generated every 250ms, so Sasser can perform 512 attacks per second.
52% of the time, the generated IP address is completely random. 25% of the time, the
first two octets of the IP address of the current host are used and the remaining two octets
are random. 23% of the time, only the first octet of the IP address of the current host is
used and the remaining three octets are random [31, 32].
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Once an address is generated, Sasser sends a series of SMB packets to TCP port
445 in an attempt to retrieve an SMB banner. If successful, the remote host's operating
system version information is extracted from the banner. If the remote operating system
is a version supported by Sasser, the worm will send the appropriate exploit packets to
TCP port 445. These exploit packets create the buffer overflow as discussed in the
LSASS vulnerability section. The buffer overflow results in a command shell on the
compromised host listening on TCP port 9996 [31, 32].
The attacking machine starts an FTP server on the local TCP port 5554 and awaits
a connection. Using the remote command shell on the compromised host, the attacking
computer creates a script file "CMD.FTP" which contains instructions to download and
execute a copy of the Sasser worm from the attacking computer. The worm is
downloaded as a file named "[random]_up.exe" where “[random]” is a random integer
between 0 and 32,767. After download, the FTP thread is terminated. Also, the script
CMD.FTP is removed once the worm begins executing on the newly infected host [31,
32].
Payload: Sasser contains no payload. Apparently, the only purpose of the worm
is to propagate. It should be noted however that the exploitation of the LSASS
vulnerability may cause the LSASS process to crash and Windows to reboot.
Variants: The following table shows the differences between the Sasser variants.
Like Blaster, the distinctions between the worm variants are file names, port numbers,
registry keys, and text located in the worm body. The actual exploitation code used is the
same across all variants. Unlike most other worms, there were no improvements made to
the worm in subsequent versions - the changes made were trivial. Details of the worm
variants that are not included in the table are the same as described above.
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Table 2 – Sasser Variants
A

B

C

D

E

F

G

Date
discovered

5/1/04

5/1/04

5/2/04

5/3/04

5/8/04

5/10/04

5/25/04

File name

avserve.exe

avserve2.exe

avserve2.exe

lsasss.exe

napatch.exe

wserver.exe

Registry
key1

avserve.exe =
%Windows%
\avserve.exe

avserve2.exe
=
%Windows%
\avserve2.exe

avserve2.exe
=
%Windows%
\avserve2.exe

avserve.exe =
%Windows%
\lsasss.exe

napatch.exe
=
%Windows%
\napatch.exe

wserver =
%Windows%
\wserver.exe

Jokaba31

Jobaka3
(unused) and
JumpallsNls
Tillt

Jobaka3
(unused) and
JumpallsNlsT
illt

Jobaka3
(unused) and
SkynetSasser
VersionWith
PingFast

SkynetNotice

billgate

Jobaka3
(unused) and
PinaasoSky

9996

9996

9996

9995

1022

9996

9996

5554

5554

5554

5554

1023

5554

5554

128

128

1024

128

128

128

125

512

5120

40960

5120

5120

512

WIN.LOG

WIN2.LOG

WIN2.LOG

WIN2.LOG

Mutex

Command
shell port
FTP server
port
# threads
Attacks per
second
Log file
name

Original
version

Other

skynetave.ex
e
skynetave.ex
e=
%Windows%
\skynetave.ex
e

Pings target
before attack.
Only works
on XP

FTPLOG.TX
T
Same as D.
Displays
message after
2 hours.
Attempts to
remove
Bagle.W and
Bagle.X

WIN.LOG

WIN2.LOG

Includes
copy of
Netsky.AC

3.3.3 Slammer

Slammer, unlike Blaster and Sasser, is a memory-resident worm. Memory
resident worms differ from typical worms in that a memory-resident worm never exists as
a file on a hard disk. Rather, the memory-resident worm will exist only in a system’s
memory. This tends to make these types of worms more difficult to detect after the
infection has occurred than a normal worm. Antivirus scanners that do not support
memory scanning will not be able to detect these worms.
1

All registry keys are located at
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
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Slammer (sometimes known as Sapphire) first began to spread on January 25th,
2003. This worm is remarkable in that it is the fastest worm to date – it infected 90% of
all vulnerable hosts in ten minutes by using the SQL Server 2000 vulnerability discussed
below. The worm was able to infect at least 75,000 systems running Microsoft’s SQL
Server 2000 [39].
The Exploit: This vulnerability was reported by David Litchfield of
NGSSoftware Insight Security Research on July 25th, 2002. The related Microsoft
Security Bulletin is MS02-039 [37, 38].
Microsoft's SQL Server 2000, by default, listens on UDP port 1434, designated as
the Microsoft SQL Monitor port. A client is then able to determine how to connect to the
server by sending a single byte packet to this port. The server will then inform the client
how to connect.
This port also accepts other types of messages. If a packet is sent to this port, and
the first byte of the packet is set to 0x04, the SQL Monitor process will attempt to open a
registry key as specified by information contained in the packet. This registry key will be
of the form:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Microsoft/Microsoft SQL Server\<string from
packet>\MSSQLServer\CurrentVersion

An attacker is able to create a stack-based buffer overflow by sending an overly large
string in this type of packet. Thus, an attacker is able to execute arbitrary code [37, 38].
Infection/Propagation: As Slammer is a memory-resident worm, the infection
and propagation phases are combined into one.
Slammer is a very small worm. It spreads as a single 404-byte UDP packet sent
to port 1434. When run, Slammer randomly generates target IP addresses, and, using a
socket command, sends the specially-crafted UDP packet to the target address on port
1434. Unlike Blaster and Sasser, Slammer never uses parts of the host's IP address in
order to preferentially infect the current local network [31, 32].
The speed with which Slammer spread is due to several factors. Firstly, only a
single packet is necessary for exploitation and propagation. Secondly, Slammer is so
small - merely 404 bytes total. Finally, because Slammer uses UDP as opposed to TCP,
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the worm did not incur the additional overhead of the TCP handshaking phase. Slammer
is able to send packets as quickly as the underlying system will permit [39].
Payload: Slammer carried no payload. It seems that the only intention of the
worm is to continually spread itself. The worm did have the unintended side-effect of
causing a DoS attack due to the speed with with Slammer spread [32].
Variants: There are no known variants of the Slammer worm [32].

3.3.4 CodeRed

The CodeRed, or Bady, worm is another example of a memory-resident worm. It
began spreading approximately on July 13, 2001 and was able to infect around 1,000
computers running vulnerable version of Microsoft’s IIS software [42].
The Exploit: This vulnerability in Microsoft’s IIS server software was
discovered by Riley Hassell of eEye Digital Security [40] and reported on June 18, 2001.
Microsoft addressed the issue the same day in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS01-033
[41] and issued a patch. The vulnerability was present in IIS servers running on
Windows NT, 2000, and XP (which was a beta version at the time the vulnerability was
discovered.)
As part of the default IIS installation, a component called the Indexing Service is
installed with the server. The Indexing Service provides the ability to rapidly search files
on the machine. The ida.dll, which is part of the Indexing Service, provides support for
running scripts. The ida.dll contains an overflow vulnerability due to lack of proper
bounds checking on user input.
If an attacker sends an overly long HTTP GET message to the server and if that
message is handled by the ida.dll, the attacker may exploit this vulnerability and gain
SYSTEM level access. The necessary message is of the form:
GET /something.ida?[overflow]=X HTTP/1.1

This will create a traditional stack-based buffer overflow that may be exploited by an
attacker.
One obstacle exists in the exploitation of this vulnerability. The bytes in the
buffer provided by the attacker in the GET request are expanded. Thus, if an attacker
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fills the overflow buffer with the character 'A' (hex representation: 0x41) the actual value
written to the stack on the victim machine will be 0x0041. This creates a problem when
writing shellcode for this vulnerability and when attempting to overwrite the saved return
address on the stack. The shellcode must be placed at an address of the form
0x00xx00yy in order to exploit this vulnerability. Luckily, due to the heap layout of the
IIS server, a return address like this is possible.
In order to exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must first properly set up the
heap, place the shellcode at a memory location that the exploit is able to access, and
finally overflow the stack using the ida.dll method described above. Given the heap
layout and default installation parameters of the IIS server, this vulnerability is
exploitable. However, due to the nature of the heap region of memory, the exploit may
occasionally fail, depending on what memory looks like at the time of the attack [40, 41].
Infection: CodeRed uses the aforementioned .ida buffer overflow vulnerability
in Microsoft's IIS software. As it is a memory-resident worm, Code Red never exists on
the hard disk. Rather, the worm uses the overflowed buffer to hold a complete copy of its
code. The worm is able to “hijack” the IIS process's execution thread and begin
execution of its own.
First, CodeRed imports the necessary function addresses that it needs in order to
execute. Theses addresses are obtained from the IIS process itself. Next, the worm
creates 100 threads – the first ninety-nine threads are used to scan for other vulnerable
systems while the last thread is used to implement the worm's payload. Each thread
checks for the existence of the file C:\notworm. If the file exists, the worm becomes
dormant. Otherwise, the worm continues.
Each worm thread also checks the system time. If the time is between 20:00 and
23:59 UTC, the worm performs a DOS attack against www.whitehouse.gov. If the time
is before 20:00 UTC, the worm proceeds with its propagation cycle. The worm becomes
dormant if the time is after 23:59 UTC.
The 100th worm thread checks the default language of the infected system. If the
language is English, this thread will deface all the web pages served by this system.
Otherwise, this thread will perform the same set of actions as the other threads [31, 32,
42].
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Propagation: CodeRed generates semi-random IP addresses in order to
propagate. The addresses are semi-random because each copy of the worm uses the same
static number to seed its random number generator. Thus, every worm copy will scan the
same sequence of “random” addresses.
The worm spreads by sending a TCP SYN message to port 80 of the generated IP
address. If the server responds, the worm send its attack packet – a malformed HTTP
GET request as described above [31, 32, 42].
Payload: CodeRed contains two payloads. The first is a Denial of Service attack
on www.whitehouse.gov. This attack is performed if the system time is between 20:00
and 23:59 UTC. If this condition is satisfied, each worm thread will attempt to connect to
www.whitehouse.gov on TCP port 80. If successful, each thread will send 0x18000
single byte packets to the target. The thread will then sleep for approximately four and
one half hours, then wake and resume the attack.
The second payload is that Code Red is able to deface every web page served by
the infected machine. The 100th thread created by Code Red will check the default
system language. If the language is English, this thread will sleep for two hours. The
worm then wakes and modifies, in memory, the DLL responsible for sending web page
data back to the client. The DLL is changed so that the server responds to every request
by a client for a web page with a page that displays the text “Welcome to
http://www.worm.com ! Hacked by Chinese!” After ten hours, the worm restores the
original DLL in memory and goes dormant [31, 32, 42].
Variants: There is one known variant of CodeRed. This variant, CodeRed.B or
CodeRed version 2, was released shortly after the initial version of the worm.
CodeRed.B changes the semi-random number generator used by the original version to a
completely random number generator. Thus, each copy of this variant will scan a
different sequence of random IP addresses. Also, this variant does not deface websites.
There is another worm named CodeRed II. Although this worm exploits the same
.ida vulnerability, it has a completely different code base. CodeRed II is not a variant of
CodeRed but instead is a different worm altogether [32].
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3.4 Summary
This concludes the section of related work and background information. An
overview of conventional worm detection/prevention systems was supplied, as well as an
introduction to related research. A detailed description of the worms used in this study
was also provided. The next section will describe the implementation details, as well as
the reasoning behind the methods, employed by the system proposed by this paper.
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4 Research Design
The previous sections discussed the reasons why it is desirable to build a
heuristic-based worm detection system. Background information to reinforce these
reasons was also provided. This section will discuss both the general and specific design
procedures for the research.

4.1 General Method
As previously stated, a heuristic-based worm detection system provides several
benefits over other similarly-aimed systems. The main goal of the system, however, is
the detection of both known and unknown worm threats through the use of a minimal rule
set. This section will describe the method used in conducting this research.
The first step in conducting the research was obtaining the necessary background
information. Much of this was briefly described in the previous chapter. Sources for this
information included relevant research and technical papers, websites, journals, and
textbooks.
The second step was collecting the data. In this case, the data was information on
worms. Two sources were used for this step – information on the technical details of
several worms and actual network captures of several worms in action. In order to obtain
the network captures, live copies of the worms were run on a test network. Other copies
of worm traffic were obtained from Internet sources [45]. A network sniffer was used to
collect the network data. Additionally, clean network traffic was collected to compare
with the worm traffic to look for anomalies.
Next, the worm data was carefully examined for possible heuristics. Each worm
was compared with the others for commonalities. The worms were also compared with a
variety of clean network traffic in order to look for anomalies. Possible heuristics were
then extracted and were implemented as rules in an NIDS. The worm network captures
were then run against the NIDS to determine which heuristics properly detected worms
and which did not. Additionally, the circumstances under which each heuristic worked
were noted. When necessary, heuristics were revised or removed completely.
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The heuristics were also tested against a variety of clean network traffic captures
to test for false positives. Naturally, a heuristic becomes useless if it detects many clean
network packets as worms. Finally, the complete system was tested on a live network
and the results were analyzed.

4.2 Specific Procedure
In order to develop the heuristic-based worm detection system, worm data first
needed to be collected. This was accomplished in two ways. First, worm technical
details were obtained from a variety of sources (See Section 3.3). Second, live copies of
several worms were obtained from [43]. The worms used in this study were Blaster.A,
Blaster.E, Sasser.B, Sasser.D, Slammer, and CodeRedv2 (as classified by [31]). These
worms exemplify a wide variety of techniques used by malicious worms and are
therefore expected to be good choices for heuristic analysis. Blaster and Sasser generate
a lot of network traffic, use a remote command shell and file transfer protocol to transmit
themselves, and edit the Windows registry settings. CodeRed and Slammer, on the other
hand, are much smaller in terms of network traffic, exist only in memory, and use very
precisely written exploit code. Given that the worms used in the study exhibit such
differences, it is hoped that any heuristics found for this group of worms will apply to the
majority of worms.
Each worm was then run in a clean virtual environment. This was done using the
VMware software package [44] on Windows XP. Two virtual machines were set up, and
a network was simulated using tools included with VMware. Each virtual machine also
ran a copy of Microsoft Windows XP. No patches were applied to the virtual machines.
Ethereal version 0.10.10, a network sniffer [45], was run on each virtual machine to
capture network traffic at both end points. A worm was executed on one of the virtual
machines, and the traffic was captured as the worm propagated to the other virtual
machine. After each run, the network data was saved and the virtual machines were
deleted. A new set of virtual machines was used for each worm to avoid any wormworm interaction. Selected excerpts from each worm’s network traffic can be found in
Appendix A.
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Using the worm data, possible heuristics were examined. Heuristics falling into
three broad categories were found – behavior-based, exploit-based, and packet anomalybased. A behavior-based heuristic comes from the way in which worms generally behave
on a network. For example, the presence of a host performing random scanning is a
behavior-based heuristic. An exploit-based heuristic comes from the exploits that worms
employ in order to propagate from host to host. As all worms used in this study used
some sort of buffer overflow exploit, this was the exploit that was focused on. There are
certain characteristics of a buffer overflow attack that it is possible to detect by
examining the network traffic. These are examples of exploit-based heuristics. Finally,
packet anomaly-based heuristics come from worms generating their own packet header
information. In doing so, some fields in the packet header may be filled with invalid or
nonsensical information. These erroneous fields lead to packet anomaly-based heuristics.
The heuristics that were tested in this study are explained in detail in the following
section.
Each heuristic was then implemented as a rule using Snort version 2.3.2, a
popular NIDS [46]. (The Snort configuration file implementing the heuristics from the
study can be found in Appendix B.) The worm traffic was replayed through Snort on a
GNU/Linux machine to determine which heuristics were successful and against which
worms the heuristics were successful. These findings are presented in the next chapter.
Additionally, a variety of clean network traffic was obtained from live networks. The
following is a list of where the different clean network traffic captures were obtained:
•

A Windows XP Home workstation on a home network

•

A GNU/Linux (Debian, mostly from the Testing distribution)
workstation on a home network

•

A Windows 2003 Server Domain Controller on a small (~ 30 users)
office network

•

A Windows 2003 Server application server in a DMZ on a small office
network

•

A production Windows 2003 Server web server in a DMZ on a small
office network

•

A GNU/Linux (Debian) workstation on a small office network
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In each case, the traffic capture lasted approximately two hours and was sampled at
various times during the day. In the case of the servers on the office network, the traffic
was only sampled for ten minutes at a time due to the high levels of network traffic at
these locations. Approximately five captures were used for each machine. The
performance of the heuristics on the clean network traffic is also presented in the next
chapter.
A large database of rules for detecting existing exploits and attacks is available
for free for use with Snort. This database is maintained by the Snort developers and
contains approximately three thousand rules. Interestingly, none of the worms used in
this study were detected by any of these rules. Additionally, a large number of Snort
rules are available on the internet for use in detecting worms. All of these rules that were
found were very specific to a worm and fail to even detect a simple variant of the worm
they were written to detect. None of these types of rules were used in the study.
An advantage of implementing the system using Snort is that Snort can be
configured to work inline with iptables, a software firewall. When used together, traffic
can be first analyzed by Snort and then, if necessary, blocked by the firewall. This
achieves both goals of worm detection and prevention using a heuristic-based system.
Finally, the heuristic-based worm detection system was tested on a live network.
(See Figure 23 in the next chapter.) This is the same office network used for the network
traffic captures listed above. Once again, the perforce of the system is reported in the
next chapter.

4.3 Heuristics
This section will present the heuristics used in this study. It will also show why
each is a possible heuristic for detecting worms. A heuristic is considered useful as long
as it can detect the worm anytime before the actual worm body reaches the target host.
Heuristics have been used in antivirus software for some time now. Examples of
heuristics used here are an incorrect file size in the executable file header, a strange
location for the beginning of code execution in the executable file, the presence of
strange section names in the executable file, and suspicious code redirections [3].
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Unfortunately, heuristics for viruses are generally not applicable to worms. This section
will propose possible heuristics for worm detection. The virus heuristics assume that the
virus has already reached the target system. In the case of a worm, a detection system
has the opportunity to prevent the worm from ever reaching the target system. This is the
goal of the heuristics that are investigated here. The next chapter will examine their
effectiveness.
The heuristics here are divided into three categories – behavior-based, exploitbased, and packet anomaly-based.

4.3.1 Behavior-based

One behavior that all worms exhibit is some sort of scanning activity. This is
fundamental to the worm, as one of the purposes of a worm is to spread to new hosts. In
order to discover these hosts, the worm must scan the network. This results in several
possible heuristics.
The first is to watch for a single source address that is attempting to connect to
many destination addresses on the same port. This scanning technique is called a
“portsweep” and is indicative of an infected machine attempting to find new targets with
a particular port, and hence service, open. To implement this heuristic, each unique
connection from a source address to a destination address and port on the protected
network is logged.1 If the number of unique pairs with the same source address exceeds a
threshold within a certain time period, the conditions for this rule are satisfied. For an
example of the CodeRed worm performing a portsweep on TCP port 80, see Figure 25.
This heuristic will probably only be successful if the worm is using a linear scanning
method – the worm randomly chooses an IP address, then increments the address and
scans again. This heuristic will also be successful for worms originating from the local
network. This method is often used by worms, for example Blaster and Sasser. If the
worm is using a more random target selection method, the time between when the

1

By “protected network” it is meant the network on which the heuristic-based worm detection system
resides.
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infected host first scans the network and when it scans the same network a second, third,
forth, etc. time will likely be too great to be detected.

Figure 25 – Example of a portsweep performed by CodeRed.

A second heuristic is to watch for failed connection attempts. This is a more
specific rule than the previous one. There are two types of failed connections. The first
is when a computer attempts to connect to another computer that does not exist. In this
case, an ICMP Destination Unreachable message may be generated. The second is when
a computer attempts to connect to a closed TCP port on another computer. In this case, a
TCP RESET message will be generated. Both of these conditions are indicative of worm
traffic because, as the worm is generating addresses to scan, these addresses will often
not be valid or will be for a system that is not open to that type of connection. These
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conditions are not likely to arise under normal network operations but may occasionally
happen if a packet is malformed or if a network interface is misconfigured. To
implement, only failed connection attempts (as indicated by the previously specified two
types of messages) to the protected network are logged. The conditions for this heuristic
are satisfied if the number of failed connections from one source address exceeds a
threshold within a certain time period. Once again, this heuristic is only likely to be
successful if the worm uses a linear scanning method. This technique was derived from
[19] and [20].
Another scanning characteristic that can be turned into a heuristic is the fact that
when a worm is generating addresses to scan, it may generate unroutable IP addresses;
see Figure 26 for an example and notice the number of scanned addresses falling in the
range 0.0.0.0/8. As specified in RFC 3330, this range is a specialized address range and
may not apply to the network in question. If the addresses are definitely not used on the
local network, this can be used to detect a worm. If it is noticed that a single source
address is attempting to connect to more than threshold invalid destination addresses
within a given time limit, that source may be randomly generating addresses to scan.
These invalid destination addresses include such addresses spaces as those reserved for
local network use (ex. 192.168.x.x) and those reserved for multicast use. The drawbacks
of this heuristic are that it is network specific and must be tailored to each use. Also, it
will only be able to detect worms originating from the local network.
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Figure 26 – Example of CodeRed scanning invalid IP addresses.

Another behavior trait that many worms exhibit is the use of a command shell at
some point during the attack. Thus, a possible heuristic here is the presence of command
shell-indicative strings, such as “C:\Windows” and “cmd” for Windows systems, in the
network traffic. This has an advantage over the previous two behavior-based heuristics in
that no record keeping is needed in order to implement this. However, these types of
strings may be fairly common in network traffic. This possibility exists to restrict this
heuristic to monitoring ranges of port numbers where these strings are not likely to occur.
See Figure 27 for an example of a command shell being used by Sasser.
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Figure 27 – Example of Sasser using a command shell.

4.3.2 Exploit-based

Given that all worms use some exploit technique, the area of exploits provides an
excellent opportunity for generating heuristics. The heuristics investigated here range
from quite general to fairly specific in nature. Most focus on the buffer overflow exploit
technique.
The first heuristic used here is the presence of a NOP ramp in the payload section
of a packet. A NOP ramp is used to give the exploit that a worm is using a greater
likelihood of working properly. The most common NOP ramp used on an IA32
architecture is a series of 0x90 instructions. If a series of 0x90s exists in the payload
section of a packet (notice the series of 0x90s in the middle of the Blaster packet in
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Figure 28), it is likely that this packet is part of an exploit. It is possible to use a
combination of other machine instructions to achieve the same “do nothing” effect of the
0x90 instruction. However, as only 0x90 instructions were used for the NOP ramps in
the worms used in this study, this was the only NOP ramp style that was tested.

Figure 28 – Example of a NOP ramp in a Blaster exploit packet.

A second heuristic that was investigated in this category was the presence of a
well-known return address, similar to the method used in [23]. Unfortunately, it was
found that the return addresses for the exploits used by the various worms in this study
were very different. Thus, a separate rule must be written for each exploit. However,
this heuristic should be able to detect any worm that uses the targeted exploit. For
example, several worms use the previously mentioned RPC DCOM exploit. All of these
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worms would need to have the same, or very similar, return addresses present somewhere
in the payload section of an attack packet.
A third heuristic used here is also fairly exploit-specific. Each exploit used by a
worm in this study relies on the existence of an unchecked buffer. The lengths of these
buffers can easily be validated by an NIDS. For example, Blaster uses an unchecked
hostname field in an RPC packet. By implementation design, this hostname should not
be longer than thirty-two bytes. The heuristic used here validates that this is the case.
This heuristic will also detect all other worms, such as all the Blaster and Welchia
variants, that employ this exploit.
This technique was applied to the other worms in the study as well. In the case of
CodeRed and the .ida exploit, any packet using the .ida interface should not be longer
than 240 bytes. Thus, the heuristic used here validates that, if an HTTP packet contains
the string “.ida”, it is not longer than 240 bytes. Once again, this heuristic should succeed
against any worm that uses this particular exploit, such as CodeRed, CodeRed II, and any
variants.
For the Slammer worm, it is sufficient to simply check for an overly long RPC
packet sent to UDP port 1434 that begins with the bytes 0x04. The 0x04 bytes specify a
certain type of packet not used under normal operation by Microsoft’s SQL Server.
Another exploit-based heuristic that was tested is the presence API or function
calls that are often used by viruses and worms. These are usually functions needed to
import the addresses of other functions, or perform other system-related tasks. The
strings used here are “Kernel32.dll”, “LoadLibraryA”, “CreateFileA”, “GetProcAddress”,
and “Sleep”. Notice the presence of many of these strings in one of the Blaster packets
seen in Figure 29. These are, of course, Windows specific.
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Figure 29 – Example of suspicious function calls in a Blaster exploit packet.

4.3.3 Packet anomaly-based

The final class of heuristics is based on a worm forming its own attack packets. A
worm must custom build the exploit packets, and must also often custom build other
packets used in the attack. Unfortunately, after reviewing the worms used in the study, it
appears that most worms rely on the underlying operating system’s network stack to form
the network and transport layer packet headers. Thus, such items as an incorrect packet
checksum or invalid combination of TCP flags are not present in the worm attack
packets. Packet anomaly-based heuristics, as far as the network and transport layer
protocols are concerned, appear to be weak heuristics for detecting worms.
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Worms do, however, often, if not always, form their own application-level packet
headers. (Worms also of course form the packet payload section. This was the focus of
the previous section on exploit-based heuristics.) For example, in its attack on SQL
Server, Slammer sends an RPC packet where all the RPC fields are set to 0x01. (See
Figure 30.) Malformed headers such as this can be used as heuristics.

Figure 30 – Example of invalid RPC flags set in the Slammer packet.

A drawback in using packet anomaly-based heuristics is that one must know all
possible valid values for a particular field. This is not trivial in some situations. The
heuristic rule must then be written to detect all values that fall outside this range. Then, if
this heuristic is to be used for all possible worms, not just all existing ones, that process
must be repeated for every exploitable field in every application-level packet header. The
key here is to know which fields are exploitable. If that is known, it may be simpler just
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to patch the software in question. If this is not possible, perhaps due to incompatible
versions of software, packet anomaly-based heuristics can be used.

4.4 Summary
This chapter presented the procedures used in the study. The heuristics that were
used were also introduced. The next chapter will describe the experiments that were
conducted and the results of those experiments.
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5 Findings
This section will discuss the experiments used to test the heuristics for worm
detection. Following that discussion, the implications of the results of the experiments
will be described.

5.1 Experiments and Tools
Each heuristic was implemented as a rule (and in some cases, several rules) in the
NIDS Snort [46]. For the complete Snort rules file that was used in the study, see
Appendix B. Additionally, several Snort preprocessors were needed to implement certain
rules, such as network scanning detection. These preprocessors are configured in the
Snort configuration file (See Appendix B.)
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Table 3 – Heuristics that Detected Each Worm
Worm

Detected By
•
•
•

RPC exploit
Command shell – “C:\Windows”
Suspicious strings – “GetProcAddress”,
“LoadLibraryA”, “Kernel32.dll”
• NOP ramp
• Portsweep

Blaster
(variants A and E)

• LSASS exploit
• Command shell – “cmd”

Sasser

• Suspicious strings – “GetProcAddress”,

(variants B and D)

“LoadLibraryA”, “Kernel32.dll”
• NOP ramp
• Portsweep
• Scanning invalid address ranges – Null,
CodeRed

Private IP, Cable TV, Public Data
• Suspicious strings – “LoadLibraryA”,
“CreateFileA”, “Sleep”
• MS SQL exploit
• NOP ramp

Slammer

• Invalid RPC flags

Captures of worm network traffic was obtained as detailed in the previous
chapter. Table 3 lists the rules that detected each worm.
In order to demonstrate the operation of the system in a working network
environment, the system was tested on a small network consisting of approximately thirty
users. This network has two subnets, a DMZ and an internal network, both located
behind a firewall. Several servers offering a variety of services, including http, ftp, and
an Oracle database, are located on the network. See Figure 31.
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Figure 31 – A diagram of the network used to test the heuristics.

In the above diagram, all servers run Windows 2003 Server. All of the
workstations run Windows XP Professional, with the exception of a Debian Linux
machine used to run the worm detection system. The domain controller provides several
services including Active Directory and several software license managers and also acts
as a file server. The Oracle server is a dedicated Oracle server. The application server
provides access to several large software packages, notably the ArcGIS software
package. The web server hosts a web site, an ftp site, and several license managers for
users outside of the local network. The application server and web server are both open
to the outside network on several different ports.
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The system was tested at several locations on this network in order to test for false
positives. Table 4 shows the rules that incorrectly identified a worm in clean network
traffic. The number in parenthesis after the erroneous rule specifies the number of times
that the rule was erroneously triggered.

Table 4 – False Positives
System

Erroneous Rule

Total Number of Packets

Windows 2003 application server

none

2,279

Windows 2003 web server

TCP portscan (12)

397,316

Windows 2003 domain controller

TCP portscan (114)

2,456,128

Windows XP workstation

none

254,910

Debian Linux workstation

Suspicious string – “Sleep” (1)

9,926

5.2 Results
Interestingly, none of the built-in Snort rules detected any of the worms. The
Snort rule set used here was the free rule set provided with Snort. Other subscriptionbased rule sets are available for Snort, but these were not tested. However, the free Snort
rule set is updated regularly and is quite extensive. It contains approximately three
thousand rules for known exploits and attacks.
From the previous two tables, it is seen that the rules written to detect the specific
exploit used by a worm always correctly identify the worm and its variants. These types
of rules also never falsely identified clean network traffic as containing a worm.
These types of rules are excellent heuristics for identifying a worm. From the
discussion on worms and their related exploits (Section 3.3), it is evident that there is
often ample time between when an exploit is made public and when a worm using that
exploit is released to analyze the exploit and write a detection rule. This method does
have advantages over simply writing a detection rule for each worm as it is released.
Focusing on detecting exploits, as opposed to detecting worms, makes it possible to
detect all worm families and variants that use the particular exploit. Additionally, if
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properly written, it can be certain that the heuristic will detect any worm that makes use
of the exploit. If a heuristic such as this is detected in network traffic, it is sufficient
evidence of the presence of a worm, or possibly a human attacker actively attacking the
system. In either case, future traffic from that source should be blocked.
There are some problems and considerations that should be accounted for when
using this method of worm detection. It requires that a rule is written for each relevant
exploit as it is released.1 Also, the exploit used by the worm may not be made public.
This could happen for a variety of reasons. The exploit could be made available to the
software vender and the vender never releases a patch. The worm author may be the one
who discovered the exploit, and the exploit was never released at all (the so-called “zeroday” exploits). These are all problems with using a system that employs only exploitspecific heuristics.
Similar to above, the detection of a return address used by a particular exploit also
succeeds in accurately identifying the presence of a worm. This heuristic also generated
zero false positives. This method also requires that a new detection rule be written as
each new exploit is released. It was found during this study that determining the return
address used by a particular exploit is generally more complex that determining how the
exploit works and basing the detection rule on that. In other words, if the exploit is to be
analyzed in order to generate a detection rule, it may be simpler to write a rule to detect
the exploit itself (as in the previous heuristic) than to write a rule to detect the return
address.
The NOP ramp heuristic also correctly identified the majority of the worms. (The
CodeRed worm is so specifically written that its shellcode does not contain a NOP ramp.
This has the added consequence that the worm will not properly run on some systems.)
Unfortunately, this heuristic can be found in clean network traffic under certain
circumstances. In the testing done for this study, a series of 0x90s was found in network
traffic for the ArcGIS software package. However, by simply restricting the NOP

1

By “relevant exploit” it is meant an exploit that applies to the network in question. For example, if an
exploit targets a Solaris web server and there are no Solaris web servers on the network, there is obviously
no need to write of rule for this exploit. This makes the number of exploits that need to be considered more
manageable.
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heuristic to only apply to traffic from external networks, all of these false positives are
removed.
Similar to the NOP heuristic, the presence of certain strings in the traffic also
identified several worms. These strings are those to detect a command shell
(“C:\Windows”, “cmd”) and those to detect potential virus-like behavior (“Kernel32.dll”,
“LoadLibraryA”, “GetProcAddress”, “Sleep”, etc.) These strings were also found in the
clean network traffic; especially when a client machine runs a process off of an
application server. The false positives were removed again by restricting the detection of
this heuristic to traffic from external sources.
The string “Sleep” is somewhat different from the other strings listed. This string
is much more common for general use than the others. This heuristic did generate one
false positive – the string “sleep” did turn up in an Instant Messenger conversation that
took place while the worm detection system was running. The only worm that contained
the string “Sleep” was CodeRed, which also contained “CreateFileA” and
“LoadLibraryA.” The string “Sleep” can be safely eliminated from the heuristic set.
Although the majority of false positives were removed by restricting the detection
of certain heuristics to traffic from external sources, this may not be a viable
configuration option under some very specific situations. If an application server is
intentionally left open to external networks on certain ports, false positives may occur.
The test network was by no means a closed network. Many services are available to
external networks, as illustrated by Figure 31. Thus, the heuristics used here have been
tested against many network configuration possibilities.
The detection of a portsweep also appears to be a good heuristic for worm
detection, as exhibited by Sasser and CodeRed. (The study was unable to test Blaster and
Slammer for scanning activity. The traffic samples of these worms either did not contain
any scanning activity or simply contained ARP traffic as the worm attempted to discover
local addresses.) The sfPortscan Snort preprocessor was used to detect the portsweeps.
Of note here is the fact that both ICMP Destination Unreachable and TCP RESET
messages were not found in the worm traffic. The ICMP messages were not seen
because the router on the test network was not able to generate these types of messages.
The TCP RESET messages were not seen because the only other hosts on the test
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network were open targets. These messages were also not found in the clean network
traffic. Further testing should be done to determine the utility of these heuristics.
Some of the clean network captures contained false positives for TCP portscans.
The portscans are also detected by using the sfPortscan Snort preprocessor. While a
portscan is not a worm heuristic, the same preprocessor is also used to detect portsweeps,
so the portscan false positives are commented on here. Once again, these false positives
are generated by the ArcGIS software package. Similarly to the above situation, many of
the false positives can be removed by restricting the portscan/portsweep detection to
traffic from external sources. Also, the firewall on the test network generated UDP
portscan false positives. This was removed by ignoring the IP address of the firewall in
the sfPortscan preprocessor. This demonstrates that a system such as the one proposed
here will always need to be configured in order to properly operate on a given network.
Also related to scanning is the invalid IP address heuristic. This heuristic
successfully detected the worms that the scanning traffic was available for including
Sasser and CodeRed. However, this heuristic is very dependant on the current network
situation. During the initial test run, many false positives were detected. The test
network used some private IP addresses (192.168.x.x) and some multicast addresses
(239.255.255.x). After the heuristic was set to ignore these addresses, there were zero
false positives.
Finally, the single packet anomaly heuristic tested here – an invalid combination
of RPC flags, successfully detected the Slammer worm. This heuristic also demonstrated
zero false positives. However, this heuristic is very worm-specific and can be easily
subverted. For example, a worm could randomly generate the RPC header each time it
ran, thus bypassing this rule. Alternatively, the worm could simply write valid
information in the header. The header here is part of the buffer overflow, but it is a part
where it does not matter what the data is. Any arbitrary value could have been written
here in this case.
This study also experimented with declaring traffic to be worm-related only when
it exhibited two or more different heuristics within a particular TCP session. This was
done as an alternative to ignoring traffic originating form the local network as a method
of removing the false positives. In order to implement this functionality, the flowbits
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component of Snort was used. flowbits enables a user to set or unset user-defined flags
based on certain characteristics of network traffic during a session. Unfortunately, the
worms used here only exhibited one unique heuristic per TCP session. Additionally, if
traffic is only declared to be worm-related if it exhibits two or more different heuristics
during the entire communication between two systems, this does nothing to remove the
false positives seen in the sample clean traffic. Over the course of the entire
communication between two systems, traffic in this study exhibiting false positives
always triggered two or more false positives.

5.3 Summary
This section presented the results of the research. Given the results that all worms
were detected and a minimal false positive rate was achieved, it can be said that the
heuristic-based worm detection system was successful. The following chapter presents
some final thoughts and suggestions for future work.
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6 Conclusions and Future Work

6.1 Conclusions
In conclusion, the most successful heuristics for worm detection appear to be the
exploit-specific detection rules. These rules will detect all worm families and variants the
employ the exploit in question. However, in order to write the detection rule, the exploit
must first be fully understood, and the rule must then be implemented in an NIDS,
The other exploit-based heuristics – the presence of a NOP ramp or other
suspicious strings – are also successful in detecting worms. However, these heuristics
also have the potential of falsely identifying clean network traffic as worm traffic. These
heuristics were seen in the clean network traffic used in this study, but were restricted to
local traffic. All false positives were removed only by checking traffic from external
sources for these heuristics. The applicability of these rules depends on the network at
hand.
Many of the behavior-based were also successful in detecting worms. Scanning
activity, specifically portsweeps, appears to be a good worm detection heuristic.
Portsweeps were not seen in clean network traffic. The portsweep detection engine,
sfPortscan, did have to be tuned to reduce the false positive rate of portscans, but this is
unrelated to worm detection. The presence of a command shell in the traffic can also be
used as a worm detection heuristic. However, this heuristic has the potential of appearing
in clean network traffic. Once again, some configuration of the system (as well as a
thorough understanding of the underlying network) is necessary in order to implement
this system on a given network.
Scanning of an invalid IP address range detected a large number of worms in the
study. This heuristic is very network specific and must be tuned to the network at hand.
A good understanding of the local network traffic is needed in order to use this heuristic.
Also, this heuristic is only able to detect worms originating from the local network, for
example, if the local network was used to initiate the worm.
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Taken together, these heuristics appear to make up a valuable worm detection
system. It is robust in that is does not rely on one specific aspect of a worm for detection.
Additionally, it produced an acceptable false positive rate, although more testing is
necessary to verify this.

6.2 Future Work
The research presented in this paper provides several possibilities for future
research. These suggestions are briefly outlined here.
Firstly and most directly related to the current research, several of the heuristics
presented here could use further testing. For example, the ICMP Destination
Unreachable and TCP RESET messages were not seen at all in any network traffic used
in the study. Further work should be done to determine if these are valid heuristics for
worm detection.
An additional need for future work exists in the fact that the heuristics found in
this study should be tested on other worms. It would be interesting to see if these
heuristics were equally successful in detecting worms on other operating systems, such as
the Linux worms Slapper, ADM, Ramen, and Li0n, and the BSD worm Scalper. It is
very possible that a single set of heuristics would be able to detect and prevent worms on
all types of systems, and this possibility should definitely be investigated.
Also, as future worms are released, these worms should be continuously tested to
verify that they too are detected by the heuristic set. If there are not, the heuristic set
should be revised.
To date, no worm exists that uses encryption in order to propagate unnoticed. If
an encrypted worm did become active, it is unlikely that the system outlined here would
be able to detect such a worm. Another obstacle here is that devising an algorithm to
decrypt such a worm also compromises the confidentiality of other encrypted traffic.
More research needs to be done in this area.
A final area that should be looked in to is the possibility of implementing such a
system as this in hardware. Similar functionality is required by hardware firewalls,
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routers, and switches, so it should not be too difficult to accomplish this. This would
greatly increase the performance, and thus usability, of such a system.

6.3 Summary
This section presented some final thoughts on the research study and listed some
suggestions for future work. The following appendices contain sample worm traffic
captures and the actual Snort rule configuration file used for the study.
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Appendix A – Worm Traffic Captures
A.1 Blaster.E Attack
No. Time

Source

Destination

Protocol

36 62.096334 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
37 62.111543 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
38 62.119829 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Win=64240 Len=0
84 68.148712 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
ISystemActivator
85 68.153414 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
request
86 68.156569 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
Win=64240 Len=0
87 68.156801 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=244
88 68.157311 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
89 68.158292 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
Win=63996 Len=0
90 68.167528 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
max_xmit: 5840 max_recv: 5840
91 68.190159 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Win=0 Len=0
92 68.321669 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
93 68.323583 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
Ack=0 Win=0 Len=0
95 68.640568 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
96 68.650128 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
97 68.651532 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Win=64240 Len=0
98 68.791232 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=39
99 68.971113 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
Win=64201 Len=0
105 70.408937 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
Win=64201 Len=39
106 70.521803 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Win=64201 Len=0
107 70.522516 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
Ack=40 Win=64201 Len=104
109 70.613860 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Win=64097 Len=0
111 71.527032 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
Transfer type: octet
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Info

TCP

1035 > epmap [SYN] Seq=0 Ack=0

TCP

epmap > 1035 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0

TCP

1035 > epmap [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1

DCERPC Bind:

call_id: 127 UUID:

ISystemActivator

RemoteCreateInstance

TCP

epmap > 1035 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1533

TCP

1035 > epmap [PSH, ACK] Seq=1533

TCP

1035 > epmap [FIN, ACK] Seq=1777

TCP

epmap > 1035 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1778

DCERPC Bind_ack:

call_id: 127 accept

TCP

1035 > epmap [RST] Seq=1778 Ack=1

TCP

1047 > 4444

[SYN] Seq=0 Ack=0

TCP

4444 > 1047

[RST, ACK] Seq=0

TCP

1047 > 4444

[SYN] Seq=0 Ack=0

TCP

4444 > 1047

[SYN, ACK] Seq=0

TCP

1047 > 4444

[ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1

TCP

1047 > 4444

[PSH, ACK] Seq=1

TCP

4444 > 1047 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=40

TCP

4444 > 1047 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=40

TCP

1047 > 4444 [ACK] Seq=40 Ack=40

TCP

4444 > 1047 [PSH, ACK] Seq=40

TCP

1047 > 4444 [ACK] Seq=40 Ack=144

TFTP

Read Request, File: mslaugh.exe,

112 72.012624 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
113 72.016138 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
126 73.012607 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
129 73.825084 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
130 73.825556 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
133 74.209214 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
134 74.209502 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
136 75.220711 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
139 76.843353 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
140 76.843687 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
144 77.442511 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
145 77.442934 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
146 78.437749 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
147 78.658711 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
148 78.658997 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
149 79.207280 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
150 79.207548 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
154 79.748767 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
155 79.749023 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
158 80.378258 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
159 80.378562 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
163 80.885412 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
164 80.900262 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
167 81.866794 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
168 81.898315 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
169 81.926466 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
171 82.560410 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
172 82.560859 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
173 83.553606 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
174 84.234077 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
175 84.234360 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
176 84.413567 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
Ack=40 Win=64201 Len=61
177 84.741020 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Win=64036 Len=0
178 84.741124 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
Ack=40 Win=64201 Len=22
180 85.050052 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Win=64014 Len=0
181 86.001421 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Ack=227 Win=64014 Len=18
182 86.002563 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
Ack=58 Win=64183 Len=18
183 86.256351 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Win=63996 Len=0
184 86.417021 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
Ack=58 Win=64183 Len=2
185 86.448937 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Win=63994 Len=0
186 86.449065 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
Ack=58 Win=64183 Len=20
188 86.526381 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Win=63974 Len=0
189 86.777317 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Ack=267 Win=63974 Len=12
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TFTP Data Packet, Block: 1
TFTP Acknowledgement, Block: 1
TFTP Acknowledgement, Block: 1
TFTP Data Packet, Block: 2
TFTP Acknowledgement, Block: 2
TFTP Data Packet, Block: 3
TFTP Acknowledgement, Block: 3
TFTP Acknowledgement, Block: 3
TFTP Data Packet, Block: 4
TFTP Acknowledgement, Block: 4
TFTP Data Packet, Block: 5
TFTP Acknowledgement, Block: 5
TFTP Acknowledgement, Block: 5
TFTP Data Packet, Block: 6
TFTP Acknowledgement, Block: 6
TFTP Data Packet, Block: 7
TFTP Acknowledgement, Block: 7
TFTP Data Packet, Block: 8
TFTP Acknowledgement, Block: 8
TFTP Data Packet, Block: 9
TFTP Acknowledgement, Block: 9
TFTP Data Packet, Block: 10
TFTP Acknowledgement, Block: 10
TFTP Acknowledgement, Block: 10
TFTP Data Packet, Block: 11
TFTP Acknowledgement, Block: 11
TFTP Data Packet, Block: 12
TFTP Acknowledgement, Block: 12
TFTP Acknowledgement, Block: 12
TFTP Data Packet, Block: 13 (last)
TFTP Acknowledgement, Block: 13
TCP 4444 > 1047 [PSH, ACK] Seq=144
TCP

1047 > 4444 [ACK] Seq=40 Ack=205

TCP

4444 > 1047 [PSH, ACK] Seq=205

TCP

1047 > 4444 [ACK] Seq=40 Ack=227

TCP

1047 > 4444 [PSH, ACK] Seq=40

TCP

4444 > 1047 [PSH, ACK] Seq=227

TCP

1047 > 4444 [ACK] Seq=58 Ack=245

TCP

4444 > 1047 [PSH, ACK] Seq=245

TCP

1047 > 4444 [ACK] Seq=58 Ack=247

TCP

4444 > 1047 [PSH, ACK] Seq=247

TCP

1047 > 4444 [ACK] Seq=58 Ack=267

TCP

1047 > 4444 [PSH, ACK] Seq=58

190 86.777833 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
Ack=70 Win=64171 Len=12
191 86.824281 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Win=63962 Len=0
192 87.215719 192.168.12.10
192.168.12.128
Ack=70 Win=64171 Len=2
193 87.243569 192.168.12.128
192.168.12.10
Win=0 Len=0

TCP

4444 > 1047 [PSH, ACK] Seq=267

TCP

1047 > 4444 [ACK] Seq=70 Ack=279

TCP

4444 > 1047 [PSH, ACK] Seq=279

TCP

1047 > 4444 [RST] Seq=70 Ack=279

A.2 Sasser.B Attack
No. Time
Source
Destination
Protocol
Info
258 65.596072 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
DCERPC Bind: call_id: 1 UUID: LSA_DS
259 65.612911 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
DCERPC Bind_ack: call_id: 1 accept
max_xmit: 4280 max_recv: 4280
260 65.616824 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
LSA_DS DsRolerUpgradeDownlevelServer
request
261 65.632879 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
TCP [Continuation to #260] 4094 >
microsoft-ds [ACK] Seq=2350 Ack=805 Win=63436 Len=1460
262 65.632934 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
TCP
microsoft-ds > 4094 [ACK] Seq=805
Ack=3810 Win=64240 Len=0
263 65.632992 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
TCP [Continuation to #260] 4094 >
microsoft-ds [PSH, ACK] Seq=3810 Ack=805 Win=63436 Len=400
264 65.671912 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
TCP
microsoft-ds > 4094 [ACK] Seq=805
Ack=4210 Win=63840 Len=0
266 65.735587 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
LSA_DS DsRolerUpgradeDownlevelServer
response
267 65.864981 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
TCP 4094 > microsoft-ds [ACK] Seq=4210
Ack=913 Win=63328 Len=0
269 66.655254 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
TCP 4094 > microsoft-ds [RST] Seq=4210
Ack=2186884980 Win=0 Len=0
270 66.658232 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
TCP 4504 > 9996 [SYN] Seq=0 Ack=0
Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
271 66.683474 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
TCP 9996 > 4504 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1
Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
272 66.701761 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
TCP 4504 > 9996 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1
Win=64240 Len=0
273 66.738611 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
TCP 4504 > 9996 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1
Win=64240 Len=1
274 66.878233 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
TCP 9996 > 4504 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2
Win=64239 Len=0
275 66.894938 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
TCP 4504 > 9996 [PSH, ACK] Seq=2 Ack=1
Win=64240 Len=213
276 67.106302 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
TCP 9996 > 4504 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=215
Win=64026 Len=0
277 67.161264 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
TCP 9996 > 4504 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1
Ack=215 Win=64026 Len=39
278 67.242064 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
TCP 4504 > 9996 [ACK] Seq=215 Ack=40
Win=64201 Len=0
279 67.242469 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
TCP 9996 > 4504 [PSH, ACK] Seq=40
Ack=215 Win=64026 Len=279
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281 67.400247 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Win=63922 Len=0
282 67.421268 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Ack=215 Win=64026 Len=6
283 67.606510 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Win=63916 Len=0
284 67.637454 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Win=0 Len=0
287 69.034619 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
288 69.047886 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
289 69.048402 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Win=64240 Len=0
290 69.084592 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Win=64240 Len=7
291 69.086141 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Win=64233 Len=16
292 69.092347 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Ack=17 Win=64224 Len=7
293 69.092760 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Ack=15 Win=64226 Len=10
294 69.093417 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Ack=27 Win=64214 Len=7
295 69.156259 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Win=64219 Len=0
296 69.312476 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Ack=22 Win=64219 Len=26
297 69.313431 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Ack=53 Win=64188 Len=7
298 69.313711 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Ack=29 Win=64212 Len=19
299 69.314470 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Ack=72 Win=64169 Len=7
300 69.323307 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
301 69.323466 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460
302 69.326757 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Win=64240 Len=0
303 69.328826 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Win=64240 Len=1
304 69.396331 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Win=64240 Len=1460
305 69.415058 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Win=64240 Len=0
306 69.432319 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=579
307 69.485138 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Win=64205 Len=0
308 69.492887 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=1460
309 69.493012 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Win=64240 Len=0
310 69.506455 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=1086
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TCP

4504 > 9996 [ACK] Seq=215 Ack=319

TCP

9996 > 4504 [PSH, ACK] Seq=319

TCP

4504 > 9996 [ACK] Seq=215 Ack=325

TCP

4504 > 9996 [RST] Seq=215 Ack=325

TCP

1036 > 5554 [SYN] Seq=0 Ack=0

TCP

5554 > 1036 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1

TCP

1036 > 5554 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1

TCP

5554 > 1036 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1

TCP

1036 > 5554 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=8

TCP

5554 > 1036 [PSH, ACK] Seq=8

TCP

1036 > 5554 [PSH, ACK] Seq=17

TCP

5554 > 1036 [PSH, ACK] Seq=15

TCP

1036 > 5554 [ACK] Seq=27 Ack=22

TCP

1036 > 5554 [PSH, ACK] Seq=27

TCP

5554 > 1036 [PSH, ACK] Seq=22

TCP

1036 > 5554 [PSH, ACK] Seq=53

TCP

5554 > 1036 [PSH, ACK] Seq=29

TCP

1832 > 1037 [SYN] Seq=0 Ack=0

TCP

1037 > 1832 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1

TCP

1832 > 1037 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1

TCP

1832 > 1037 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1

TCP

1832 > 1037 [PSH, ACK] Seq=2 Ack=1

TCP

1037 > 1832 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1462

TCP

1832 > 1037 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1462

TCP

1036 > 5554 [ACK] Seq=72 Ack=36

TCP

1832 > 1037 [PSH, ACK] Seq=2041

TCP

1037 > 1832 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=3501

TCP

1832 > 1037 [PSH, ACK] Seq=3501

311 69.523699 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=1460
312 69.523954 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Win=64240 Len=0
313 69.547117 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=1289
314 69.621923 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=1460
315 69.622050 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Win=64240 Len=0
316 69.653490 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=1030
317 69.681536 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=1460
318 69.693890 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Win=64240 Len=0
319 69.712120 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=353
320 69.725205 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=1460
321 69.725339 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Win=64240 Len=0
322 69.763059 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=1022
323 69.931545 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Win=63218 Len=0
324 69.931646 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=1460
325 69.949907 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Seq=15581 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=292
326 69.950199 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Win=64240 Len=0
327 69.950279 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Ack=72 Win=64169 Len=7
328 70.023099 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Ack=15874 Win=64240 Len=0
329 70.024304 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Ack=43 Win=64198 Len=6
330 70.030866 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Win=64240 Len=0
331 70.053306 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Ack=78 Win=64163 Len=0
332 70.053440 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Win=64198 Len=0
333 70.053774 192.168.12.131
192.168.12.130
Ack=44 Win=64198 Len=0
334 70.087628 192.168.12.130
192.168.12.131
Win=64163 Len=0

TCP

1832 > 1037 [PSH, ACK] Seq=4587

TCP

1037 > 1832 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=6047

TCP

1832 > 1037 [PSH, ACK] Seq=6047

TCP

1832 > 1037 [PSH, ACK] Seq=7336

TCP

1037 > 1832 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=8796

TCP

1832 > 1037 [PSH, ACK] Seq=8796

TCP

1832 > 1037 [PSH, ACK] Seq=9826

TCP

1037 > 1832 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=11286

TCP

1832 > 1037 [PSH, ACK] Seq=11286

TCP

1832 > 1037 [PSH, ACK] Seq=11639

TCP

1037 > 1832 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=13099

TCP

1832 > 1037 [PSH, ACK] Seq=13099

TCP

1037 > 1832 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=14121

TCP

1832 > 1037 [PSH, ACK] Seq=14121

TCP

1832 > 1037 [FIN, PSH, ACK]

TCP

1037 > 1832 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=15874

TCP

5554 > 1036 [PSH, ACK] Seq=36

TCP

1037 > 1832 [FIN, ACK] Seq=1

TCP

1036 > 5554 [PSH, ACK] Seq=72

TCP

1832 > 1037 [ACK] Seq=15874 Ack=2

TCP

5554 > 1036 [FIN, ACK] Seq=43

TCP

1036 > 5554 [ACK] Seq=78 Ack=44

TCP

1036 > 5554 [FIN, ACK] Seq=78

TCP

5554 > 1036 [ACK] Seq=44 Ack=79

A.3 Slammer Exploit Packet
Frame 1 (418 bytes on wire, 418 bytes captured)
Arrival Time: Oct 10, 2003 18:02:49.239104000
Time delta from previous packet: 0.000000000 seconds
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Time since reference or first frame: 0.000000000 seconds
Frame Number: 1
Packet Length: 418 bytes
Capture Length: 418 bytes
Ethernet II, Src: 00:00:0c:55:46:2c, Dst: 00:00:86:55:98:1e
Destination: 00:00:86:55:98:1e (Megahert_55:98:1e)
Source: 00:00:0c:55:46:2c (Cisco_55:46:2c)
Type: IP (0x0800)
Internet Protocol, Src Addr: 213.76.212.22 (213.76.212.22), Dst Addr: 65.165.167.86 (65.165.167.86)
Version: 4
Header length: 20 bytes
Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00)
0000 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00)
.... ..0. = ECN-Capable Transport (ECT): 0
.... ...0 = ECN-CE: 0
Total Length: 404
Identification: 0xc543 (50499)
Flags: 0x00
0... = Reserved bit: Not set
.0.. = Don't fragment: Not set
..0. = More fragments: Not set
Fragment offset: 0
Time to live: 113
Protocol: UDP (0x11)
Header checksum: 0xf0b6 (correct)
Source: 213.76.212.22 (213.76.212.22)
Destination: 65.165.167.86 (65.165.167.86)
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 20199 (20199), Dst Port: ms-sql-m (1434)
Source port: 20199 (20199)
Destination port: ms-sql-m (1434)
Length: 384
Checksum: 0x5405 (correct)
DCE RPC
Version: 4
Packet type: Ping (1)
Flags1: 0x01
0... .... = Reserved: Not set
.0.. .... = Broadcast: Not set
..0. .... = Idempotent: Not set
...0 .... = Maybe: Not set
.... 0... = No Fack: Not set
.... .0.. = Fragment: Not set
.... ..0. = Last Fragment: Not set
.... ...1 = Reserved: Set
Flags2: 0x01
0... .... = Reserved: Not set
.0.. .... = Reserved: Not set
..0. .... = Reserved: Not set
...0 .... = Reserved: Not set
.... 0... = Reserved: Not set
.... .0.. = Reserved: Not set
.... ..0. = Cancel Pending: Not set
.... ...1 = Reserved: Set
Data Representation: 010101
Byte order: Big-endian (0)
Character: EBCDIC (1)
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Floating-point: VAX (1)
Serial High: 0x01
Object UUID: 01010101-0101-0101-0101-010101010101
Interface: 01010101-0101-0101-0101-010101010101
Activity: 01010101-0101-0101-0101-010101010101
Server boot time: Jul 14, 1970 18:36:49.000000000
Interface Ver: 16843009
Sequence num: 16843009
Opnum: 257
Interface Hint: 0x0101
Activity Hint: 0x0101
Fragment len: 257
Fragment num: 257
Auth proto: Kerberos 5 (1)
Serial Low: 0x01
Kerberos authentication verifier
Protection Level: Unknown (226)
Key Version Number: 8
Authentication Verifier: 8D049001D88945B46A108D45B05031C9
0000
0010
0020
0030
0040
0050
0060
0070
0080
0090
00a0
00b0
00c0
00d0
00e0
00f0
0100
0110
0120
0130
0140
0150
0160
0170
0180
0190
01a0

00 00 86 55 98 1e 00 00 0c 55 46 2c 08 00 45 00 ...U.....UF,..E.
01 94 c5 43 00 00 71 11 f0 b6 d5 4c d4 16 41 a5 ...C..q....L..A.
a7 56 4e e7 05 9a 01 80 54 05 04 01 01 01 01 01 .VN.....T.......
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 ................
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 ................
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 ................
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 ................
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 ................
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 dc c9 b0 42 eb ..............B.
0e 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 70 ae 42 01 70 ae 42 90 ........p.B.p.B.
90 90 90 90 90 90 90 68 dc c9 b0 42 b8 01 01 01 .......h...B....
01 31 c9 b1 18 50 e2 fd 35 01 01 01 05 50 89 e5 .1...P..5....P..
51 68 2e 64 6c 6c 68 65 6c 33 32 68 6b 65 72 6e Qh.dllhel32hkern
51 68 6f 75 6e 74 68 69 63 6b 43 68 47 65 74 54 QhounthickChGetT
66 b9 6c 6c 51 68 33 32 2e 64 68 77 73 32 5f 66 f.llQh32.dhws2_f
b9 65 74 51 68 73 6f 63 6b 66 b9 74 6f 51 68 73 .etQhsockf.toQhs
65 6e 64 be 18 10 ae 42 8d 45 d4 50 ff 16 50 8d end....B.E.P..P.
45 e0 50 8d 45 f0 50 ff 16 50 be 10 10 ae 42 8b E.P.E.P..P....B.
1e 8b 03 3d 55 8b ec 51 74 05 be 1c 10 ae 42 ff ...=U..Qt.....B.
16 ff d0 31 c9 51 51 50 81 f1 03 01 04 9b 81 f1 ...1.QQP........
01 01 01 01 51 8d 45 cc 50 8b 45 c0 50 ff 16 6a ....Q.E.P.E.P..j
11 6a 02 6a 02 ff d0 50 8d 45 c4 50 8b 45 c0 50 .j.j...P.E.P.E.P
ff 16 89 c6 09 db 81 f3 3c 61 d9 ff 8b 45 b4 8d ........<a...E..
0c 40 8d 14 88 c1 e2 04 01 c2 c1 e2 08 29 c2 8d .@...........)..
04 90 01 d8 89 45 b4 6a 10 8d 45 b0 50 31 c9 51 .....E.j..E.P1.Q
66 81 f1 78 01 51 8d 45 03 50 8b 45 ac 50 ff d6 f..x.Q.E.P.E.P..
eb ca
..

99

A.4 CodeRed Attack
No. Time
Source
Destination
Protocol
Info
1 0.000000 192.168.1.1
192.168.1.105
TCP
7329 > www [SYN] Seq=226171687
Ack=0 Win=512 Len=0 MSS=1460
2 0.000000 192.168.1.105
192.168.1.1
TCP
www > 7329 [SYN, ACK]
eq=1197939112 Ack=226171688 Win=17520 Len=0 MSS=1460
3 0.000000 192.168.1.1
192.168.1.105
TCP 7329 > www [ACK] eq=226171688
Ack=1197939113 Win=32120 Len=0
4 0.000000 192.168.1.1
192.168.1.105
HTTP GET
/default.ida?NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN
NNNNNNNNNNNNNN%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u909
0%u6858%ucbd3%u7801%u9090%u9090%u8190%u00c3%u0003%u8b00%u531b%u53ff%u007
8%u0000%u00=a HTTP/1.0
5 0.000000 192.168.1.1
192.168.1.105
HTTP Continuation or non-HTTP traffic
6 0.010000 192.168.1.105
192.168.1.1
TCP
www > 7329 [ACK] Seq=1197939113
Ack=226174608 Win=17520 Len=0
7 0.010000 192.168.1.1
192.168.1.105
HTTP Continuation or non-HTTP traffic
8 0.010000 192.168.1.105
192.168.1.1
HTTP GET
9 0.030000 192.168.1.1
192.168.1.105
TCP
7329 > www [ACK] Seq=226175727
Ack=1197939117 Win=32120 Len=0
310 19.000000 192.168.1.1
192.168.1.105
TCP 7329 > www [FIN, ACK] Seq=226175727
Ack=1197939117 Win=32120 Len=0
311 19.000000 192.168.1.105
192.168.1.1
TCP www > 7329 [ACK] Seq=1197939117
Ack=226175728 Win=16401 Len=0
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Appendix B Implementation of Heuristics in Snort
# ---------------# LOCAL RULES
# ----------------

# ---------------# Behavior Based
# ---------------# Many of these heuristics are implemented using the sfPortscan module in the snort.conf file
# Examples of using the module are as follows:
#
# To detect ICMP Destination Unreachable / Portsweep
# preprocessor sfportscan: proto { icmp } \
scan_type { portsweep } \
memcap { 10000000 } \
sense_level { low }
#
# Note: A Filtered ICMP Portsweep alert means no Destination Unreachable messages were seen
#
#
# To detect TCP RESET / Portsweep
# preprocessor sfportscan: proto { tcp } \
scan_type { portsweep } \
memcap { 10000000 } \
sense_level { low }
#
# Note: A Filtered TCP Portsweep alert means no RESET messages were seen
# Check for scans to unused address space, such as multicast or private
# Must be customized for current network
alert ip any any -> 10.0.0.0/8 any (msg:"Invalid destination address - Private IP RFC 1918";)
alert ip any any -> 172.16.0.0/12 any (msg:"Invalid destination address - Private IP RFC 1918";)
alert ip any any -> 192.168.0.0/16 any (msg:"Invalid destination address - Private IP RFC 1918";)
alert ip any any -> 0.0.0.0/8 any (msg:"Invalid destination address - Null";)
alert ip any any -> 14.0.0.0/8 any (msg:"Invalid destination address - Public Data Network RFC 1700";)
alert ip any any -> 24.0.0.0/8 any (msg:"Invalid destination address - Cable TV Network";)
alert ip any any -> 127.0.0.0/8 any (msg:"Invalid destination address - Loopback RFC 1700";)
alert ip any any -> 169.254.0.0/16 any (msg:"Invalid destination address - auto DHCP";)
alert ip any any -> 192.0.2.0/24 any (msg:"Invalid destination address - Testnet";)
alert ip any any -> 192.88.99.0/24 any (msg:"Invalid destination address - 6to4 Relay Anycast RFC 3068";)
alert ip any any -> 192.18.0.0/15 any (msg:"Invalid destination address - Network Interconnect RFC
2544";)
alert ip any any -> 224.0.0.0/4 any (msg:"Invalid destination address - Multicast RFC 3171";)
alert ip any any -> 240.0.0.0/5 any (msg:"Invalid destination address - Class E";)

# ---------------# Exploit Based
# ----------------
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# LSASS Exploit
# Checks for SMB packet, after RPC Bind attempt, with protocol number 9 –
#
DsRolerUpgradeDownlevelServer
# This sequence is impossible without modifying the Windows API
alert tcp any any -> any 445 (msg:"LSASS DsRolerUpgradeDownlevelServer exploit part 1"; content:"|53
4d 42|"; depth:10; content:"|5c 00 50 00 49 00 50 00 45 00 5c|"; distance:32; content:"|0b|"; distance:2;
flowbits:set,lsass_bind_call; flowbits:noalert;)
alert tcp any any -> any 445 (msg:"LSASS DsRolerUpgradeDownlevelServer exploit attempt";
content:"|FF|SMB"; depth:4; offset:4; nocase; content:"|05|"; distance:59; content:"|00|"; within:1;
distance:1; content:"|09 00|"; within:2; distance:19; flowbits:isset,lsass_bind_call;)
# RPC DCOM Exploit
# Checks for overly long server name
alert tcp any any -> any 135 (msg:"RPC DCOM Exploit"; content:"|00 5C 00 5C|"; content:!"|5C|";
within:32;)
# IIS overflow
alert tcp any any -> any 80 (msg:"IIS overflow"; uricontent:"ida?"; dsize:>240;)
# MSSQL exploit
alert udp any any -> any 1434 (msg:"SQL overflow"; content:"|04|"; depth:1; dsize:>250;)

# RPC DCOM return address (little endian) Windows XP
alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"Blaster return address - Windows XP"; content:"|9d 13 00 01|";)
# RPC DCOM return address (little endian) Windows 2000
#alert ip any any -> any any (msg:"Blaster return address - Windows 2000"; content:"|9f 75 18|";)
# NOP sled in shellcode
alert ip $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"SHELLCODE x86 NOP ramp2";
content:"|90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90|"; classtype:shellcode-detect;)
# Command shell
# Check for strings common to Windows command shell
alert ip $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"Possilbe command shell - C\:\\Windows";
content:"C\:\\Windows"; nocase; sid:1000004; rev:1;)
alert ip $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"Possible command shell - cmd";
content:"cmd"; nocase;)
# Suspicious strings
alert ip $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"Suspicious string - Kernel32.dll";
content:"kernel32.dll"; nocase;)
alert ip $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"Suspicious string - LoadLibraryA";
content:"loadlibrarya"; nocase;)
alert ip $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"Suspicious string - CreateFileA";
content:"createfilea"; nocase;)
alert ip $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"Suspicious string - GetProcAddress";
content:"getprocaddress"; nocase;)
alert ip $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"Suspicious string - Sleep"; content:"sleep";
nocase;)

# ---------------# Packet anomaly Based
# ----------------

102

# Invalid RPC Flags
alert udp any any -> any 1434 (msg:"Invalid RPC flags"; content:"|01 01|"; depth:4;)

# Notes:
# Other configuration settings used in the research include the setting of the $HOME_NET and
# HTTP_SERVERS variables, setting the portsweep rules to ignore the firewall, and setting Snort
# to log all possible alerts for each packet
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Appendix C Definitions
Backdoor - program that allows remote access to a machine
Buffer Overflow - exploit technique where data fills up an unchecked buffer and
continues to overwrite adjacent memory locations
Email Virus – a virus that is able to transmit itself via email
Firewall – a system designed to restrict access to a network
Host - a networked computing device
Mass-mailer – a virus that sends itself in an email, same as email virus
Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) - software that inspects network activity
and identifies suspicious packets
Polymorphic Worm – a worm that regularly transforms its payload
Portscan – a single machine scanning a single target machine for open ports
Portsweep – a single machine scanning multiple target machines for a single open port
Shellcode - small pieces of code written in assembly language used to launch a command
shell. Typically used in conjunction with a buffer overflow attack
Target - destination host as chosen by a worm
Trojan Horse - a malicious program that attempts to appeal to a user with some useful
functionality to entice user to run the program. Also, compromised versions of
real tools that hide their malicious activities
Virus - code that recursively replicates a possibly evolved copy of itself, typically having
a detrimental effect
Worm - a self-replicating program able to propagate itself across networks with no
human intervention, typically having a detrimental effect
Zero-day Vulnerability – a vulnerability that has not been released to the original
software vendor or to the public
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